What Is the Gist of the Mail Fraud Statute? by Williams, C.J.
Oklahoma Law Review 
Volume 66 Number 2 
2014 
What Is the Gist of the Mail Fraud Statute? 
C.J. Williams 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr 
 Part of the Criminal Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
C.J. Williams, What Is the Gist of the Mail Fraud Statute?, 66 OKLA. L. REV. 287 (2013), 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol66/iss2/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons. 
It has been accepted for inclusion in Oklahoma Law Review by an authorized editor of University of Oklahoma 
College of Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact darinfox@ou.edu. 
 
287 
WHAT IS THE GIST OF THE MAIL FRAUD 
STATUTE? 
C.J. WILLIAMS* 
Under jurisprudence interpreting the mail fraud statute, it is an accepted 
truism that each separate mailing made in connection with a “scheme or 
artifice to defraud” constitutes a separate offense.1  This truism arose from 
the mail fraud statute’s unique past.2  In enacting the original mail fraud 
statute in 1872, Congress aimed to punish those who misused a government 
agency, namely the United States Post Office, in the process of executing a 
fraudulent scheme.3  Congressional authority to enact legislation on matters 
affecting the United States mail was the basis for federal jurisdiction to 
make mail fraud a federal criminal offense.4  It was the intentional abuse of 
the United States mail to carry out a fraud, therefore, and not the underlying 
fraud, that was the essence or gist of the mail fraud statute.5  Because it was 
                                                                                                                 
 * Adjunct Professor of Law, University of Iowa College of Law; Assistant United 
States Attorney, United States Attorney’s Office, Northern District of Iowa.  This Article 
was written by the author acting in his private capacity and not as an employee of the United 
States government.  All statements made herein reflect only the author’s own views and 
opinions and not those of the United States of America or the United States Department of 
Justice. 
 1. See, e.g., United States v. Gardner, 65 F.3d 82, 85 (8th Cir. 1995) (“[It is] not the 
general plan or scheme that is punished but rather each individual use of the mails in 
furtherance of that scheme.”); United States v. Kennedy, 64 F.3d 1465, 1476 (10th Cir. 
1995) (finding that each separate mailing constitutes a separate mail fraud offense); United 
States v. McClelland, 868 F.2d 704, 706 (5th Cir. 1989) (same); United States v. Vaughn, 
797 F.2d 1485, 1493 (9th Cir. 1986) (same); United States v. Stull, 743 F.2d 439, 444 (6th 
Cir. 1984) (same, and citing other cases for same proposition); United States v. Ledesma, 
632 F.2d 670, 679 (7th Cir. 1980) (same). 
 2. See infra text accompanying notes 35-43. 
 3. See infra text accompanying notes 35-37. 
 4. Specifically, the power of Congress to enact the original mail fraud statute derived 
from the postal power, found in Article I, Section 8, Clause 7 of the United States 
Constitution, which provides Congress authority “[t]o establish Post Offices and post 
Roads.”  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 7. 
 5. See, e.g., Mitchell v. United States, 142 F.2d 480, 481 (10th Cir. 1944) (“But the 
gist and crux of the offense is the use of the mails in the execution of the scheme . . . .”); 
United States v. Horman, 118 F. 780, 780 (S.D. Ohio 1901) (“[T]he policy of this statute is 
to prevent the misuse of the mails of the United States, -- the prostitution of the mails of the 
United States in furtherance of dishonest schemes.”), aff’d, 116 F. 350 (6th Cir. 1902); 
United States v. Loring, 91 F. 881, 885 (N.D. Ill. 1884) (“The gist of this offense does not 
consist in the fraudulent scheme alone, but in using the post-office establishment of the 
United States for the purpose of executing a fraud.”); United States v. Jones, 10 F. 469, 470 
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the misuse of the United States mail, and not the creation of a fraud scheme, 
that was the essence of the original mail fraud statute, it logically followed 
that each separate use of the United States mails for the purpose of carrying 
out a scheme to defraud others constituted a separate violation of the mail 
fraud statute.   
Nearly a century and a half has elapsed since the enactment of the 
original mail fraud statute in 1872.6  During this time, Congress has 
repeatedly recast the statute’s language, significantly altering the focus and 
essence of the mail fraud statute.7  Indeed, use of the United States mail is 
no longer even necessary to violate the mail fraud statute because Congress 
amended the statute in 1994 to make it equally offensive to use a private or 
commercial interstate carrier to execute a fraudulent scheme.8  Congress 
relied on their Commerce Clause powers to expand the mail fraud statute 
beyond the United States mails and capture private carriers.9  Thus, this 
change eliminated the mail fraud statute’s reliance and focus on the misuse 
of the United States mails.  Because of this transformation, the current mail 
fraud statute bears only a vague resemblance to its ancestor.10 
Courts have further broadened the scope and shifted the direction of the 
statute by interpreting the statute to encompass essentially any fraudulent 
scheme in which some mailing occurs.11  Thus, the use of the United States 
mail or a commercial mail carrier gives rise to federal criminal jurisdiction 
even when the mailing is tangentially related to the offense.12  Furthermore, 
the statute gives rise to federal jurisdiction even when the defendant had no 
intention of using the mails to execute the fraudulent scheme.13  For all 
intents and purposes, the mail fraud statute today is a general federal fraud 
statute.  As a result, today the statute is applied to cases that never could 
have been brought under the original mail fraud statute.14  The evolution of 
                                                                                                                 
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1882) (“But the gist of the offence [sic] consists in the abuse of the mail.  The 
corpus delicti was the mailing of the letter in execution of the unlawful scheme.”). 
 6. Act of Mar. 3, 1865, § 16, 13 Stat. 504, 507.  
 7. See infra text accompanying notes 46-49, 54-59, 67-68, 79-82. 
 8. See infra text accompanying notes 88-92. 
 9. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“To regulate commerce with foreign Nations, and 
among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes”). 
 10. This is revealed most clearly by a direct comparison of the original mail fraud 
statute against the current statute, available in Appendix A.   
 11. See infra text accompanying notes 50-53, 60-75, 83-92. 
 12. See infra text accompanying notes 88-90, 92. 
 13. See infra text accompanying note 91. 
 14. See Brian C. Behrens, Comment, 18 U.S.C. § 1341 and § 1346: Deciphering the 
Confusing Letters of the Mail Fraud Statute, 13 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 489, 489 (1993) 
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the statute from a minor, narrowly tailored act to its current broad wording 
and expansive judicial interpretation has indeed made it the “true love” of 
federal prosecutors.15    
As a result of these changes, abuse of the United States mails no longer 
forms the core of the crime.  Rather, the “scheme or artifice to defraud” 
element has appropriately evolved to become the central focus and true 
“gist” of the mail fraud statute.16 The use of the United States mail, or some 
other common carrier engaged in interstate commerce, has become 
relegated to a jurisdictional element of the crime.17   
Nevertheless, courts have continued to parrot language from decisions 
issued more than a century ago by courts interpreting the original mail fraud 
statute that relied upon the postal power as a basis for federal jurisdiction.18  
Only the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has recognized that the true gist of 
today’s mail fraud statute is the scheme to defraud and not the use of the 
mails.19  Consequently, we are left with the illogical result that each mailing 
is treated as a separate offense, even though the number of mailings seldom 
bears a logical relationship to the nature or scope of the underlying 
fraudulent scheme and is often a matter of pure happenstance.20   
                                                                                                                 
(“[T]he mail fraud statute has developed so dramatically over its history that the statute’s 
original drafters would be somewhat astonished to see the situations in which it is applied 
today.”). 
 15. Federal prosecutors are not known for waxing poetic, but the mail fraud statute 
compels compassion.  
To federal prosecutors of white collar crime, the mail fraud statute is our 
Stradivarius, our Colt 45, our Louisville Slugger, our Cuisinart -- and our true 
love.  We may flirt with RICO, show off with 10b-5, and call the conspiracy 
law ‘darling,’ but we always come home to the virtues of 18 U.S.C. § 1341, 
with its simplicity, adaptability, and comfortable familiarity. 
Jed S. Rakoff, The Federal Mail Fraud Statute (Part I), 18 DUQ. L. REV. 771, 771 (1980). 
 16. See infra notes 46-102 and accompanying text.  
 17. See infra notes 83-92 and accompanying text.  
 18. See, e.g., Parr v. United States, 363 U.S. 370, 389 (1960) (finding the purpose of the 
mail fraud statute is to protect the United States mails); United States v. Lovett, 811 F.2d 
979, 983 (7th Cir. 1987) (“The objective of the mail fraud statute is to safeguard the United 
States Postal Service[] . . . .”); United States v. Lennon, 751 F.2d 737, 741 (5th Cir. 1985) 
(establishing that the mail fraud statute was designed to protect United States mails from 
abuse). 
 19. United States v. Dunning, 929 F.2d 579, 581 (10th Cir. 1991) (“[T]he gist of [the 
mail fraud statute] is devising a scheme to defraud with a purpose of executing the 
scheme . . . .”); United States v. Kelley, 929 F.2d. 582, 585 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding that the 
gist of the mail fraud statute is the scheme to defraud). 
 20. See Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Arnett, 875 F.2d 1271, 1278 (7th Cir. 1989) (dictum) 
(stating that, because each mailing or use of wires constitutes a separate offense, “the 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2013
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Not only is this result irrational, it lends support to allegations of due 
process and double jeopardy violations.21  Further, and perhaps more 
importantly, the continued focus on a mailing as the unit of prosecution 
results in applications of the statute that are both over- and underinclusive.22  
When each mailing is deemed a separate offense, the statute could be 
applied to mailings quite unrelated to the offense.  At the same time, 
making the mailing the unit of prosecution upon which the statute of 
limitations hinges can exclude from prosecution schemes to defraud which 
continue beyond a five-year period after the last mailing. 23 
The time has come to recognize the need to change the focus of the mail 
fraud statute from the use of the mail to the scheme to defraud. To illustrate 
this, Part I of this article shows that the mail fraud statute, as originally 
enacted by Congress, was based on the Postal Power Clause and focused on 
the abuse of the mail system to commit fraud, but it has since been 
substantially amended such that the use of the mails is just one basis for 
federal jurisdiction.  Part II shows how courts illogically adopted the same 
unit of prosecution analysis for the wire fraud statute, even though its 
jurisdiction was based on the Commerce Clause.  Part III relates that, in 
contrast, courts have adopted a different unit of prosecution for other 
criminal statutes even though they were modeled on the mail fraud statute.  
Finally, Part IV argues that a slight change in the statutory language can 
make clear what is obvious—the gist of the mail fraud statute is the scheme 
to defraud.   
  
                                                                                                                 
number of offenses is only tangentially related to the underlying fraud, and can be a matter 
of happenstance.”). 
 21. Id. See also infra Part IV. 
 22. The “unit of prosecution” for a criminal statute is that “aspect of criminal activity 
that the statute aims to punish.”  Courtney J. Linn, Redefining the Bank Secrecy Act: 
Currency Reporting and the Crime of Structuring, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 407, 471 
(2010).  In other words, a unit of prosecution is an act for which a new charge can be lodged 
against the defendant. See United States v. Taylor, 13 F.3d 986, 994 (6th Cir. 1994). 
 23. For purposes of the mail fraud statute, the statute of limitations begins to run as of 
the date of the last mailing in furtherance of the scheme to defraud. See, e.g., United States 
v. Crossley, 224 F.3d 847, 859 (6th Cir. 2000); United States v. Barger, 178 F.3d 844, 847 
(7th Cir. 1999); United States v. Pemberton, 121 F.3d 1157, 1163 (8th Cir. 1997); United 
States v. Eisen, 974 F.2d 246, 263 (2d Cir. 1992). 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol66/iss2/3
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I. Evolution of the Mail Fraud Statute 
The mail fraud statute has a unique, unusual, and convoluted history.24  
The statute, one of the broadest of all federal criminal statutes, had a 
modest origin.  In the aftermath of the Civil War and during the tumultuous 
Reconstruction era, Congress first began to enact criminal legislation to 
protect the integrity of the United States Post Office.  In 1865, Congress 
revised the postal laws25 by prohibiting the mailing of obscene and other 
inappropriate material.26  Shortly thereafter, Congress made it a federal 
offense to use the United States Postal Service to promote lotteries.27  These 
were narrowly tailored statutes with little lasting influence on the scope of 
federal criminal law.28  But they were the progenitors of the modern mail 
fraud statute, which, in contrast, has had a broader influence on federal 
criminal law. 
A. The Original Mail Fraud Statute and Its Early Interpretation 
Congress enacted the mail fraud statute29 in 1872 primarily to address the 
sale of counterfeit currency through the United States Mail.30  The statutory 
                                                                                                                 
 24. For an excellent, detailed history of the evolution of the mail fraud statute and 
judicial interpretation of the mail fraud statute through the 1970s, see generally Rakoff, 
supra note 15. See also John C. Coffee, Jr., The Metastasis of Mail Fraud: The Continuing 
Story of the “Evolution” of a White-Collar Crime, 21 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1 (1983). 
 25. Act of Mar. 3, 1865, § 16, 13 Stat. 504, 507. 
 26. See also DOROTHY GANFIELD FOWLER, UNMAILABLE: CONGRESS AND THE POST 
OFFICE 57 (1977) (citing CONG. GLOBE, 38TH CONG., 2D SESS. 661-62, 965-66, 1256-57, 
1311, 1391 (1865)). 
 27. Act of July 27, 1868, ch. 246, § 13, 15 Stat. 194, 196.  This statute made it a federal 
offense to use the United States Postal Service to send circulars or letters “concerning 
[illegal] lotteries, so called gift concerts, or other similar enterprises offering prizes of any 
kind on any pretext whatsoever.”  Id. 
 28. See Jason T. Elder, Comment, Federal Mail Fraud Unleashed: Revisiting the 
Criminal Catch-All, 77 OR. L. REV. 707, 709-10 (1998) (recounting early statutes addressing 
the abuse of the mails for the purpose of sending obscene materials and promoting lotteries, 
concluding the “limited legislation achieved little success,” and noting that Congress 
responded by enacting the mail fraud statute). 
 29. Act of June 8, 1872, ch. 335, § 149, 17 Stat. 283, 302.   
 30. See McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 356 (1987) (“The sponsor of the 
recodification stated, in apparent reference to the antifraud provision, that measures were 
needed ‘to prevent the frauds which are mostly gotten up in the large cities . . . by thieves, 
forgers, and rapscallions generally, for the purpose of deceiving and fleecing the innocent 
people in the country.’”) (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 41ST CONG., 3D SESS. 35 (1870) (remarks 
of Rep. Farnsworth)); see also Geraldine Szott Moohr, Mail Fraud and the Intangible Rights 
Doctrine: Someone to Watch Over Us, 31 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 153, 158 (1994) (stating that 
the statute was designed to redress schemes for selling counterfeit currency through mail). 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2013
292 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:287 
 
 
language was clearly broader than simply prohibiting the use of the mails 
for counterfeiting, however, making it a federal offense to use the mails in 
the execution of any “scheme or artifice to defraud.”31  Courts looked to the 
title of the statute, “Penalty for Misusing the Post-Office Establishment,” 
and to the mail-emphasizing language in the statute,32 in concluding that 
Congress intended the mail fraud statute to protect the United States mail 
from criminals’ use and abuse.33  Thus, courts found the original mail fraud 
statute had three elements: 
 (1) . . . [T]he persons charged must have devised a scheme or 
artifice to defraud[;] 
 (2) . . . [T]hey must have intended to effect this scheme by 
opening or intending to open correspondence with some other 
persons through the post office establishment, or by inciting such 
other person to open communication with them[; and] 
 (3) . . . [I]n carrying out such scheme, such person must have 
either deposited a letter or packet in the post office, or taken or 
received one therefrom.34  
The essence of the mail fraud statute, then, was “not so much on the 
degree of the fraud as on the degree of misuse of the mails.”35   Thus, courts 
required a showing that the defendant intended to use the mails to execute 
the fraudulent scheme.36  Moreover, the statutory language restricted the 
number of counts that could be charged, limiting it to three counts for a six-
                                                                                                                 
 31. Act of June 8, 1872 § 301. 
 32. Id.  The mail-emphasizing language included “misusing the post office 
establishment” and “proportion the punishment especially to the degree in which the abuse 
of the post-office establishment enters as an instrument into such fraudulent scheme . . . .”  
Id. 
 33. See supra note 5; see also Rakoff, supra note 15, at 783; Moohr, supra note 30, at 
159.  
 34. Stokes v. United States, 157 U.S. 187, 188-89 (1895); see also United States v. 
Young, 232 U.S. 155, 159 (1914). 
 35. Rakoff, supra note 15, at 784. 
 36. See, e.g., Stokes, 157 U.S. at 188 (listing as an element the intent to use the mails to 
effectuate the scheme to defraud); Farmer v. United States, 223 F. 903, 907 (2d Cir. 1915) 
(reversing conviction where there was insufficient evidence to prove the defendant intended 
to use the mails to effectuate the fraudulent scheme); Tyner v. United States, 23 App. D.C. 
324, 341 (1904) (finding indictment defective for failing to allege defendant intended to use 
the mails). 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol66/iss2/3
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month period, regardless of the number of mailings that occurred.37  By 
doing so, it explicitly established each mailing as a separate unit of 
prosecution.  Thus, with the language of the original mail fraud statute, 
Congress could not have been clearer that it intended to criminalize abuse 
of the United States mail in the process of executing a scheme to defraud, 
and not to criminalize fraudulent schemes in which the United States mail 
happened to be involved.   
The Supreme Court did not confront the mail fraud statute until fifteen 
years after its enactment.  In Ex parte Henry,38 the Court addressed the 
narrow issue of the number of permissible charges under the statute.  The 
defendant had been indicted two times, each indictment charging him with 
mail fraud counts for six mailings, all of which occurred in the same six-
month period.39  The unique language of the original mail fraud statute 
permitted only three charges for any fraud scheme that occurred in a six-
month period.40  The question, then, was whether the government could 
bypass this limitation by bringing multiple indictments.41  In answering this 
question in the affirmative, the Court made clear that it was not attempting 
to rule on the broader issue of the statute’s scope or purpose.42  
Nevertheless, although in dicta, the Court approved the district court’s 
finding that “[e]ach letter so taken out or put in constitutes a separate and 
distinct violation of the act.”43  
In the century following Ex parte Henry, courts repeatedly held that each 
separate mailing constituted a separate offense.44  If one delves into the 
                                                                                                                 
 37. See Act of June 8, 1872 § 301 (“The indictment, information, or complaint may 
severally charge offences [sic] to the number of three when committed within the same six 
calendar months; but the court thereupon shall give a single sentence . . . .”).  Arguably, one 
could surmise from this limitation that Congress realized the potential for prosecutors to 
abuse the statute by bringing one charge for each mailing regardless of the relation between 
the number of mailings and the scope of the fraudulent scheme.  This theory would explain 
why Congress created an arbitrary limitation of three charges: to prevent such abuse.  
Unfortunately, there is no legislative history that sheds any light on the intent of this strange 
penalty section. 
 38. 123 U.S. 372 (1887). 
 39. Id. at 373-74. 
 40. The pertinent language was: “The indictment, information, or complaint may 
severally charge offences [sic] to the number of three when committed within the same six 
calendar months.”  Act of June 8, 1872 § 301. 
 41. Henry, 123 U.S. at 374.  
 42. Id. at 374-75. 
 43. Id. at 374 (quoting the district court opinion). 
 44. Every circuit court of appeal has held each mailing constitutes a separate offense. 
See, e.g., United States v. Alston, 609 F.2d 531, 535-36 (D.C. Cir. 1979); United States v. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2013
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authority upon which courts relied in reaching this holding, one can 
ultimately trace the authority back to Ex parte Henry (that is, when they cite 
authority for the proposition).45  In other words, when courts cite authority 
for the proposition that each mailing constitutes a separate offense, that 
authority ultimately relies on the Supreme Court’s holding in Ex parte 
Henry, which, of course, interpreted the very different original mail fraud 
statute.  Thus, courts have misinterpreted the current version of the mail 
fraud and wire fraud statutes by relying on authority interpreting an old and 
very different version of the mail fraud statute.  In reality, in the 120 years 
since Ex parte Henry, both the statutory language of the mail fraud statute, 
and judicial interpretation of the statute, have changed significantly. 
B. Early Amendments to the Mail Fraud Statute  
 Congress first altered the mail fraud statute in 1889 by expressly 
including specific counterfeiting and swindling schemes under the 
definition of a “scheme or artifice to defraud.”46  For example, Congress 
included such schemes as those involving “counterfeit or spurious coin, 
bank notes, [or] paper money,” schemes “commonly called the ‘sawdust 
swindle,’” and schemes “dealing or pretending to deal in what is commonly 
                                                                                                                 
Luongo, 11 F.3d 7, 9 (1st Cir. 1993); United States v. Eskow, 422 F.2d 1060, 1064 (2d Cir. 
1970); Francis v. United States, 152 F. 155, 155 (3d Cir. 1907); United States v. Bakker, 925 
F.2d 728, 739 (4th Cir. 1991); United States v. Shaid, 730 F.2d 225, 230 (5th Cir. 1984); 
United States v. Stull, 743 F.2d 439, 444-45 (6th Cir. 1984); United States v. Joyce, 499 
F.2d 9, 18 (7th Cir. 1974); United States v. Calvert, 523 F.2d 895, 914 (8th Cir. 1975); 
United States v. Vaughn, 797 F.2d 1485, 1493 (9th Cir. 1986); Marvin v. United States, 279 
F.2d 451, 453 n.3 (10th Cir. 1960); United States v. Edmondson, 818 F.2d 768, 769 (11th 
Cir. 1987). 
 45. In United States v. Gardner, 65 F.3d 82, 85 (8th Cir. 1995), the court cited directly 
to Ex parte Henry for authority.  In Kennedy, 64 F.3d 1465, 1476 (10th Cir. 1995), the court 
cited Palmer v. United States, 229 F.2d 861, 867 (10th Cir. 1955), which in turn cited 
Badders v. United States, 240 U.S. 391, 394 (1916), which in turn cited Ex parte Henry.  In 
McClelland, 868 F.2d 704, 706 (5th Cir. 1989), the court cited no authority.  In Vaughn, 797 
F.2d 1485, 1493 (9th Cir. 1986), the court cited United States v. Weatherspoon, 581 F.2d 
595, 602 (7th Cir. 1978), and United States v. Jones, 712 F.2d 1316, 1320 (9th Cir. 1983). 
Weatherspoon in turn cited United States v. Joyce, 499 F.2d 9, 18 (7th Cir. 1974), which in 
turn relied upon Badders, which in turn cited Ex parte Henry.  Jones, on the other hand, 
while it involved a prosecution using several mail fraud counts under a single scheme to 
defraud, does not support Vaughn in that the Jones court does not specifically state that each 
mailing constitutes a separate offense.  In Stull, 743 F.2d at 444, the court relied upon 
Badders for its authority that each mailing constitutes a separate offense, which, of course, 
cited Ex parte Henry for authority.  Finally, in Ledesma, 632 F.2d 670, 679 (7th Cir. 1980), 
the court similarly cited Badders, which finds its authority in Ex parte Henry. 
 46. Act of Mar. 2, 1889, ch. 393, § 1, 25 Stat. 873, 873. 
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called ‘green articles,’ ‘green coin,’ ‘bills,’ ‘paper goods,’ ‘spurious 
treasury notes,’ ‘United States goods,’ [or] ‘green cigars,’” among other 
things.47  The legislative history fails to reveal any explanation of 
Congress’s intent in amending the statute.48  Consequently, courts 
interpreted the changes to either expand or narrow the scope of the statute 
depending on the particular court’s predisposition.49 
The only decision of any lasting importance interpreting the 1889 
version of the mail fraud statute was Durland v. United States.50  In 
Durland, the Supreme Court adopted a broad construction of the mail fraud 
statute, loosening the statute from its moorings to the abuse of the United 
States mail as the focus of the statute.51  In the midst of a national 
depression, caused in part by fraud and unbridled speculation in stocks and 
bonds, the Court was asked to determine whether the mail fraud statute 
reached a scheme to issue bonds to investors with no intention of ever 
returning the money to the investors.52  In concluding that the mail fraud 
statute departed from common law and reached misrepresentations of future 
facts, the Court stated that “beyond the letter of the statute is the evil sought 
to be remedied.”53 
A decade after the Supreme Court sanctioned a broad interpretation of 
the mail fraud statute in Durland, Congress again amended the statute, 
significantly shifting its focus even further toward the “scheme and artifice 
to defraud” element and away from the mailing element.54  This 1909 
amendment eliminated the mail-emphasizing language from the statute, 
including the language describing the prohibited conduct as “misusing the 
Post-Office establishment” and the language limiting the number of counts 
during a sixth-month period.55  The amendment further struck from the 
                                                                                                                 
 47. Id. 
 48. This is a part of a pattern of omission maintained by Congress to this day when 
amending the mail fraud statute. 
 49. Rakoff, supra note 15, at 809-11 (reviewing decisions adopting various 
interpretations of the amended mail fraud statute). 
 50. 161 U.S. 306 (1896). 
 51. Id. at 310-15.   
 52. Id. at 310. 
 53. Id. at 313.  At the time of the Durland decision, the Court had not yet dismissed the 
mailing element to only jurisdictional status.  While it agreed “the indictment would [have 
been] more satisfactory” had it focused more on the actual mailings, it held that it was still 
sufficient and the defendant could have filed a motion for a bill of particulars anyway.  Id. at 
315. 
 54. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-350, ch. 321, § 215, 35 Stat. 1088, 1130.   
 55. Id. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2013
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original mail fraud statute language requiring proof the defendant “open[ed] 
or intend[ed] to open correspondence or communication with any 
person . . . by means of the Post-Office Establishment.”56  Instead, it 
inserted language providing that a person could commit mail fraud if it 
“caused” the mails to be used.57  Thus, the amendment eliminated the 
second essential element, the element requiring the defendant intended to 
use the mails to carry out the fraudulent scheme.58  It was this element that 
made central to the offense abuse of the United States mail.  Consequently, 
since 1909 the mailing element has no longer been the gist of the mail fraud 
offense, instead it has merely functioned to establish federal jurisdiction.59   
Five years after the 1909 amendment to the mail fraud statute, a 
unanimous Supreme Court approved the amended statute’s broadened 
scope.  In United States v. Young,60 the Court rejected a narrow 
interpretation of the statute, finding that after the 1909 amendment, the 
elements of the mail fraud statute had become: 
 . . . (a) a scheme devised or intended to be devised to defraud, 
or for obtaining money or property by means of false pretenses, 
and,  
 (b) for the purpose of executing such scheme or attempting to 
do so, the placing of any letter in any post office of the United 
States to be sent or delivered by the Post Office Establishment.61 
The Court thereby clarified that the mailing element served a purely 
jurisdictional function.62  Nevertheless, though the effect of its holding was 
just the opposite, in dicta the Court parroted the worn-out phrase that “[t]he 
gist of the offense is the use of the United States mails in the execution of 
the scheme, or in attempting to do so.”63  
                                                                                                                 
 56. Id.  
 57. Id. 
 58. An annotated version of the statute, available in Appendix B, exposes the alterations 
more readily.    
 59. See Rakoff, supra note 15, at 816-17 (“[I]t no longer made sense to say that the 
statute aimed to deter the abuse of the mail system, because the defendant no longer had to 
intend any use of the mails whatsoever; the minimal use of the mails that would trigger the 
statute could, within broad limits, be an incidental or even accidental accompaniment of the 
defendant’s fraudulent scheme.”). 
 60. 232 U.S. 155 (1914). 
 61. Id. at 161. 
 62. See Rakoff, supra note 15, at 817 (stating that the Young Court construed the 
mailing requirement as a “jurisdictional element”). 
 63. Young, 232 U.S. at 159. 
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The Supreme Court soon compounded the confusion over the focus of 
the mail fraud statute by its statements in the Badders v. United States 
case.64  In Badders, the Supreme Court unanimously rejected a vagueness 
challenge to the 1909 version of the mail fraud statute.65  In dicta again, 
however, the Court cited Ex parte Henry, which relied on the unamended 
statute, for the proposition that “there is no doubt that the law may make 
each putting of a letter into the postoffice [sic] a separate offence [sic].”66  
Although it is true the law may make each mailing a separate offense, the 
Court failed to note that the 1909 amendment eliminated the mail-
emphasizing language such that the mail fraud statute no longer made each 
mailing a separate offense.  
After 1909, Congress made no further substantive changes to the 
language of the mail fraud statute until 1987.  During this nearly eighty-
year period, the lower courts expanded the scope of the mail fraud statute, 
building on the broad interpretation the Supreme Court sanctioned in 
Young.67  At the end of this period, nearly any fraudulent scheme in which 
the United States mail was somehow involved now fell within the reach of 
the mail fraud statute, so long as the use of the mail “[could] reasonably be 
foreseen.”68     
Although initially the mail fraud statute was applied only to schemes to 
deprive citizens of money or property, in the 1940s, courts began allowing 
an expansion of the mail fraud statute’s scope by including within the 
“scheme or artifice to defraud” element the concept of intangible rights.69  It 
was not until the 1970s, however, that prosecutors utilized the intangible 
rights concept on a regular basis, primarily to prosecute public corruption at 
                                                                                                                 
 64. 240 U.S. 391 (1916). 
 65. Id. at 393. 
 66. Id. at 394. 
 67. See Moohr, supra note 30, at 159; see also Roger J. Miner, Federal Courts, Federal 
Crimes, and Federalism, 10 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 117, 121 (1987) (stating that judicial 
decisions have turned the mail fraud statute “into a vehicle for the prosecution of an almost 
unlimited number of offenses bearing very little connection to the mails”). 
 68. Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 9 (1954). 
 69. See, e.g., Shushan v. United States, 117 F.2d 110, 115 (5th Cir. 1942) (expanding 
scope of statute to include any scheme by corruption of public officials), overruled on other 
grounds by United States v. Cruz, 478 F.2d 408 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Classic, 35 
F. Supp. 457, 458 (E.D. La. 1940) (using intangible rights concept to bring election 
commission’s scheme to defraud within scope of mail fraud statute); see also Michael R. 
Dreeben, Insider Trading and Intangible Rights: Redefinition of the Mail Fraud Statute, 26 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 181, 185-87 (1988) (discussing the development of the intangible rights 
doctrine). 
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the state and local levels.70  The courts approved the expansion by 
interpreting the “scheme or artifice to defraud” element to encompass not 
just property, but also the intangible right of honest services.71  In time, the 
intangible rights doctrine was extended to cover not only public fiduciary 
duties, but private fiduciary duties as well.72  By 1987, all federal courts of 
appeal had accepted an expansive interpretation of the statute and 
sanctioned the intangible rights doctrine,73 though not without some 
criticism of the danger posed by the expanded scope of the mail fraud 
statute.74  The courts continued, however, to cite earlier cases citing the 
unamended statute that held the mailing element was the gist of the mail 
fraud offense.75 
C. McNally, Congress’s Response, and Schmuck 
In 1987, the Supreme Court attempted to narrow the scope of the mail 
fraud statute, at least with regard to the intangible rights doctrine.  In 
                                                                                                                 
 70. See Dreeben, supra note 69, at 185 (“The intangible rights doctrine was developed 
primarily to prosecute corrupt political officials who furthered their personal or financial 
interests at the expense of their obligation to act in the interest of the public.”).  One of the 
early influential cases establishing the intangible rights doctrine was United States v. States, 
488 F.2d 761, 765 (8th Cir. 1973), in which the court held that the mail fraud statute covered 
a scheme to defraud citizens of “intangible political and civil rights” through election fraud. 
See Peter M. Oxman, Note, The Federal Mail Fraud Statute After McNally v. United States, 
107 S. Ct. 2875 (1987): The Remains of the Intangible Rights Doctrine and Its Proposed 
Congressional Restoration, 25 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 743, 749 (1988) (reviewing the history of 
the doctrine and the influential role played by the States case). 
 71. See, e.g., United States v. Bronston, 658 F.2d 920, 926 (2d Cir. 1981); United States 
v. George, 477 F.2d 508, 512 (7th Cir. 1973). 
 72. See, e.g., Bronston, 658 F.2d at 922 (finding a lawyer guilty of mail fraud for 
secretly representing client whose interests were adverse to other firm clients); George, 477 
F.2d at 510 (finding purchasing agent of private company guilty of mail fraud for accepting 
kickbacks from supplier). 
 73. See United Sates v. Berg, 710 F. Supp. 438, 441 n.3 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (containing a 
list of circuit court cases approving of intangible rights doctrine), rev’d on other grounds sub 
nom. United States v. Schwartz, 924 F.2d 410 (2d Cir. 1991). 
 74. See United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108, 140 n.3 (2d Cir. 1982) (Winter, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (listing cases critical of expansion of mail fraud 
statute). 
 75. See supra note 5.  At most, some courts made passing suggestions that prosecutors 
use their judgment in arriving at the number of mail fraud counts charged in relation to a 
single fraudulent scheme. See United States v. Joyce, 499 F.2d 9, 25 (7th Cir. 1974) 
(Swygert, C.J., concurring in relevant part, joined by the Court) (encouraging prosecutors to 
exercise restraint in number of mail or wire fraud charges indicted under single fraudulent 
scheme). 
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McNally v. United States,76 the Supreme Court held that the “scheme to 
defraud” element “clearly protects property rights, but does not refer to [] 
intangible right[s].”77  The McNally Court invited Congress to change the 
statute if it wanted to expand the scope of the statute to include intangible 
rights, but noted that “[i]f Congress desires to go further, it must speak 
more clearly than it has.”78 
Within a year after the Court issued its decision in McNally, Congress 
attempted to overturn the McNally decision.  In 1988, Congress enacted 18 
U.S.C. § 1346 via an eleventh-hour rider to an unrelated bill.79  The one-
sentence amendment reads: “For the purposes of this chapter, the term 
‘scheme or artifice to defraud’ includes a scheme or artifice to deprive 
another of the intangible right of honest services.”80  As a consequence of 
the manner of Congress’s response to McNally, there is almost no 
legislative history, and what little exists tends to cloud rather than clarify 
the meaning of the amendment.81  The general tenor of comments made by 
members of Congress suggests an intention to overturn McNally.  For 
example, Representative Conyers stated that the “amendment restores the 
mail fraud provision to where [it] was before the McNally decision” such 
that it would “no longer [be] necessary to determine whether or not the 
scheme . . . involved money or property.”82  While the precise scope of the 
                                                                                                                 
 76. 483 U.S. 350 (1987). 
 77. Id. at 356; see also Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 25 (1987) (describing 
its holding in McNally as concluding that the scheme to defraud element did “not reach 
‘schemes to defraud citizens of their intangible rights to honest and impartial government’ 
and that the statute is ‘limited in scope to the protection of property rights’”). 
 78. 483 U.S. at 360. 
 79. Act of Nov. 18, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7603, 102 Stat. 4181, 4508.  The text 
of the amendment was added to the bill on the same day Congress passed it.  United States v. 
Brumley, 79 F.3d 1430, 1434 (5th Cir. 1996). 
 80. Act of Nov. 18, 1988 § 7603. 
 81. As the Fifth Circuit stated in Brumley: 
The text of what is now § 1346 was never included in any bill filed in either the 
House of Representatives or the Senate . . . was never the subject of any 
committee report from either the House or the Senate and was never the subject 
of any floor debate reported in the Congressional Record. 
Brumley, 79 F.3d at 1436. 
 82. United States v. Brumley, 116 F.3d 728, 742 (5th Cir. 1997) (quoting 134 CONG. 
REC. H11,108-01 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1988)); see also United States v. Antico, 275 F.3d 245 
(3d Cir. 2001) (citing 134 CONG. REC. S17360-02 (daily ed., Nov. 10, 1988) (noting that 
Senator Biden, Chair of the Judiciary Committee, asserted the amendment intended to: 
“overturn[ ] the decision in McNally v. United States”)).  These comments may be of 
questionable value in determining congressional intent.  Representative Conyer’s comment, 
for example, was actually made in reference to another similar proposed amendment, but the 
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“scheme or artifice to defraud” element of the mail fraud statute remains for 
courts to define, it is clear that in enacting the one-sentence amendment 
Congress emphasized its focus on the “scheme and artifice to defraud” 
element as the central feature of the mail fraud statute.   
The following year, in Schmuck v. United States,83 the Court similarly 
turned the focus of the mail fraud statue toward the fraudulent scheme when 
it unmistakably relegated the use of the mails to an incidental jurisdictional 
element.84  In Schmuck, the Court held that a mailing occurring after a 
scheme was consummated was still sufficient to create federal jurisdiction 
so long as the scheme was ongoing and continuous.85  In announcing this 
holding, the Court articulated a test whereby a fraudulent scheme falls 
within the parameters of the mail fraud statute whenever “the mailing is 
part of the execution of the scheme as conceived by the perpetrator at the 
time.”86  In dissent, Justice Scalia protested, unsuccessfully, that the mail 
fraud statute was originally supposed to prohibit “mail fraud, and not mail 
and fraud.”87 Schmuck thus marked the end of any plausible argument that 
the mailing element remained the gist of the mail fraud statute. 
After Schmuck, lower courts found mailings sufficient to invoke federal 
jurisdiction in a wider variety of circumstances, even when the mailings had 
little relationship to the underlying fraud.  Courts have held the mailing 
itself need not be false or fraudulent.88  Thus, even routine mailings are 
                                                                                                                 
representative ultimately did not vote in favor the amendment as passed.  Brumley, 79 F.3d 
at 1437 n.6.  Conyers made his comments with respect to a bill he and Senator Spector 
introduced which used far more expansive language and would have covered schemes to 
“defraud[ ] another . . . of intangible rights of any kind whatsoever in any manner or for any 
purpose whatsoever . . . .”  133 CONG. REC. E3240-02 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1987) (quoting H.R. 
3089, 100th Cong. (1st Sess. 1987)).  This bill was never enacted.  Further, Senator Biden’s 
comments came after passage of the Act, entitling them to little consideration.  Brumley, 79 
F.3d at 1437. 
 83. 489 U.S. 705 (1989). 
 84. See Peter J. Henning, Maybe It Should Just Be Called Federal Fraud: The Changing 
Nature of the Mail Fraud Statute, 36 B.C. L. REV. 435, 458 (1995) (“The Court’s analysis in 
Schmuck effectively reduces the mailing element to a mere jurisdictional requirement.”); see 
also Kristen Kate Orr, Note, Fencing in the Frontier: A Look into the Limits of Mail Fraud, 
95 KY. L.J. 789, 803 (2007) (“But now the breadth of the mailing element has reduced the 
element to nothing but a jurisdictional hook, and the statute has become a generic fraud 
statute.”). 
 85. 489 U.S. at 712. 
 86. Id. at 715. 
 87. Id. at 723 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 88. See, e.g., United States v. Martin, 228 F.3d 1, 18 (1st Cir. 2000) (holding that 
mailing itself need not be deceptive); United States v. Hawkey, 148 F.3d 920, 924 (8th Cir. 
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sufficient to invoke federal jurisdiction even when they were innocent 
mailings.89  Similarly, courts have found mailings sufficient when they 
were made after the allegedly fraudulent activity.90  Courts also found that it 
was not necessary for the defendants to contemplate the use of the mails as 
a part of the scheme to defraud.91  The government need not even prove 
defendants used the mails themselves to satisfy the mailing element—it is 
sufficient if it was reasonably foreseeable that any individual would use the 
mail.92   
This is not to criticize the scope of the mail fraud statute.  Indeed, based 
on the language of the current version of the mail fraud statute, the use of 
the mails should only constitute a jurisdictional element.93  McNally, 
Congress’s responsive amendment, and Schmuck only reflect the reality that 
the focus of the mail fraud statute is the scheme to defraud element, not the 
abuse of the United States mail.  Indeed, Congress would soon make the 
use of the United States mail unnecessary for a violation of the mail fraud 
statute. 
  
                                                                                                                 
1998) (same); United States v. Coyle, 63 F.3d 1239, 1243 (3rd Cir. 1995) (same); United 
States v. Morrow, 39 F.3d 1228, 1237 (1st Cir. 1994) (same); United States v. Oldfield, 859 
F.2d 392, 400 (6th Cir. 1988) (same); United States v. Kwiat, 817 F.2d 440, 443 (7th Cir. 
1987) (same); United States v. Benny, 786 F.2d 1410, 1420 (9th Cir. 1986) (same). 
 89. See United States v. Frey, 42 F.3d 795, 798 (3d Cir. 1994) (finding that a routine 
mailing is sufficient); United States v. Nelson, 988 F.2d 798, 804 (8th Cir. 1993) (“A 
mailing may be routine or even sent for a legitimate business purpose so long as it assists in 
carrying out the fraud.”); United States v. Brocksmith, 991 F.2d 1363, 1368 (7th Cir. 1993) 
(same). 
 90. See United States v. Griffith, 17 F.3d 865, 874 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding a mailing 
sufficient even if it occurs after fraudulent acts); Brocksmith, 991 F.2d at 1367-68 (finding a 
mailing sent to lull victims into inaction after already victimized by scheme sufficient to 
invoke jurisdiction under mail fraud statute); United States v. Wallach, 935 F.2d 445, 465 
(2d Cir. 1991) (holding mailings after fraud to cover up scheme sufficient under mail fraud 
statute). 
 91. See Griffith, 17 F.3d at 874 (stating that the foreseeable use of mails was sufficient); 
Nelson, 988 F.2d at 798 (finding that the use of mails need not be contemplated, only 
foreseeable); United States v. Hollis, 971 F.2d 1441, 1448 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding that the 
reasonable foreseeability that mails will be used is sufficient). 
 92. See United States v. Pazos, 24 F.3d 660, 665 (5th Cir. 1994) (finding a letter from 
defendant’s insurance adjuster to insurer’s adjuster); United States v. United Med. & 
Surgical Supply Corp., 989 F.2d 1390, 1404 (4th Cir. 1993) (finding a mailing by the agent 
sufficient when foreseen or intended by the principal); United States v. Koen, 982 F.2d 
1101, 1107 (7th Cir. 1992) (“[I]t is irrelevant that the defendant did not personally mail the 
letters . . . .”). 
 93. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012). 
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D. The 1994 Amendment to the Mail Fraud Statute 
If there was any question after Schmuck that the use of the United States 
mails in connection with a scheme to defraud was only a jurisdictional 
element, Congress put that matter to rest by amendment.  In 1994, Congress 
broadened the mail fraud statute to cover fraudulent schemes where use of 
“private or commercial interstate carrier[s]” were involved.94  Thus, abuse 
of the United States mail is not only no longer the gist of the mail fraud 
statute.  It isn’t even necessary.  The amended mail fraud statute arguably 
creates a general federal fraud offense.95 
The amendment was an outgrowth of debate surrounding the passage of 
the Senior Citizens Against Marketing Scams Act, which was passed by the 
Senate in 1993 and incorporated by the House of Representatives into the 
Violent Crimes Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994.96  The 
congressional hearings relating to passage of these acts reflected the 
concern that telemarketers were evading the mail fraud statute by using 
private and commercial carriers to perpetrate frauds.97  Congress did not 
define the term “private or commercial interstate carrier,” but courts have 
found it encompasses such common carriers as Federal Express and DHL.98  
Nor did Congress clarify whether such a carrier must transport the letter or 
                                                                                                                 
 94. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-332, § 
250006, 108 Stat. 1796, 2087 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1994)). 
 95. See generally Henning, supra note 84 (arguing that the 1994 amendment broadens 
the scope of mail fraud statute such that it has become a general federal fraud statute).  Of 
course, Congress could make it plain by enacting a general fraud statute, simply making it a 
federal offense to commit a fraud that affects interstate or foreign commerce.   
 96. §§ 250001-250008, 108 Stat. at 2081-88. 
 97. See Mail Fraud: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Postal Operations and Servs. of 
the H. Comm. on Post Office and Civil Serv., 103d Cong. 246-300 (1993); International 
Consumer Fraud: Can Consumers Be Protected: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on 
Regulation and Gov’t Info. of the S. Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 103d Cong. 12-22, 50-
59 (1993). 
 98. See, e.g., United States v. Kieffer, 621 F.3d 825, 832-33 (8th Cir. 2010) (finding 
sufficient evidence regarding use of the mails when evidence showed document delivered by 
the United States Mail, Federal Express, or United Parcel Service); United States v. 
Coughlin, 610 F.3d 89, 97 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (finding sufficient evidence of use of the mails 
when mail was delivered either by United States Mail or Federal Express); United States v. 
Sharpe, 438 F.3d 1257, 1264 (11th Cir. 2006) (finding indictment sufficient when it alleged 
defendant used mails through commercial carrier Federal Express); United States v. 
Silvestri, 409 F.3d 1311, 1334 n.14 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding that DHL Worldwide Express 
is a “commercial interstate carrier” for purposes of the mail fraud statute); United States v. 
Gil, 297 F.3d 93, 99-100 (2d Cir. 2002) (finding use of commercial carrier Federal Express 
constitutes use of the mails). 
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package across a state line, or whether an intrastate delivery suffices so 
long as the carrier itself is engaged in interstate commerce.   
Courts have answered in the negative the question of whether the letter 
or package must cross a state line.  Courts have found that, under the 
instrumentality of interstate commerce approach, jurisdiction exists if the 
commercial carrier was generally engaged in interstate commerce; it is not 
necessary that the letter or package actually cross state lines.99  Under this 
statutory interpretation, the number of actual mailings becomes 
insignificant because the government need only show the fraudulent 
scheme involved a commercial carrier engaged in interstate commerce to 
establish federal jurisdiction.100  
When the government can obtain federal jurisdiction by the use of an 
interstate carrier, whether one or many letters were sent becomes 
secondary.  The effect of the amendment was to make it clear that the gist 
of the mail fraud statute was the fraudulent scheme itself and that protection 
of the United States mail from abuse was no longer the focus.  The 
amendment created two possible jurisdictional hooks for federal 
prosecution, either one of which is sufficient depending on the facts: (1) if 
the United States Postal Service was used, federal jurisdiction is premised 
on the Postal Power Clause; or (2) if a commercial carrier was used, federal 
jurisdiction is premised on the Commerce Clause.101  By expanding the 
                                                                                                                 
 99. See, e.g., United States v. Hasner, 340 F.3d 1261, 1270 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding 
that mail fraud by use of a private or commercial carrier applies even if the conduct took 
place entirely intrastate); Gil, 297 F.3d at 100 (upholding mail fraud count against a 
Commerce Clause challenge, reasoning that “private and commercial interstate carriers, 
which carry mailings between and among states and countries, are instrumentalities of 
interstate commerce, notwithstanding the fact that they also deliver mailings intrastate”); 
United States v. Photogrammetric Data Servs., Inc., 259 F.3d 229, 249 (4th Cir. 2001) 
(upholding constitutionality of the mail fraud statute as applied to intrastate mailing placed 
with private or commercial interstate carrier), abrogated on other grounds by Crawford v. 
Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004); see also Henning, supra note 84, at 471-73 (arguing 
persuasively that Congress intended the amendment to allow for federal jurisdiction when 
carrier was instrumentality of interstate commerce and did not intend to require proof of 
actual interstate transportation of mailing at issue). 
 100. See, e.g., Hasner, 340 F.3d at 1270 (finding jurisdiction based on the interstate 
nature of the commercial carrier’s business generally, and not based on the movement of the 
actual mailings involved in the fraudulent scheme); Gil, 297 F.3d at 100 (same). 
 101. See United States v. Louper-Morris, 672 F.3d 539, 563 (8th Cir. 2012) (holding that 
“Congress’s Postal Power provides the jurisdictional basis for . . . the mail fraud statute” 
when the United States Postal Service is involved); Hasner, 340 F.3d at 1270 (holding that 
when Congress amended the mail fraud statute in 1994 to include commercial carriers, 
“Congress properly exercised its power under the Commerce Clause”). 
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scope of the mail fraud statute to include commercial carriers, the mail 
fraud statute targets any fraudulent scheme in which mail is used, regardless 
of whether the scheme involved the United States Postal Service. 
The evolution of the mail fraud statute from an act designed to protect 
the integrity of the United State Postal Service, to a broad catchall statute 
used against any type of fraudulent scheme, has eroded support for the oft-
repeated holding that Congress intended each separate mailing constitute a 
separate offense.102  When Congress amended the mail fraud statute in 1994 
to include private and commercial mail carriers, it put beyond debate the 
conclusion that the mailing element serves only a jurisdictional function.  
Moreover, the conclusion that the mailing element is no longer the gist of 
the mail fraud statute is further apparent in light of the jurisprudence 
regarding its sister wire fraud statute. 
II. The Wire Fraud Statute 
Courts have also concluded that the same rule exists with respect to the 
less frequently used103 wire fraud statute:104 that is, each use of the wires 
constitutes a separate offense.105  If the reasoning supporting the mail fraud 
                                                                                                                 
 102. The mail fraud statute has been characterized as the “first line of defense” against 
new areas of fraud for which Congress has not yet enacted specific prohibitions. See United 
States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395, 405 (1974) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); see also Rakoff, supra 
note 15, at 772 (stating that the mail fraud statute’s uses are “too numerous to catalog, [but 
includes] not only the full range of consumer frauds, stock frauds, land frauds, bank frauds, 
insurance frauds, and commodity frauds, but have extended even to such areas as blackmail, 
counterfeiting, election fraud, and bribery”); Kathleen Flavin & Kathleen Corrigan, Mail and 
Wire Fraud, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 861, 862 (1996) (“When legislatures have been slow to 
act in particular areas, these [mail and wire fraud] statutes have ‘frequently represented the 
sole instrument of justice that could be wielded against the ever-innovative practitioners of 
deceit.’”) (quoting Rakoff, supra note 15, at 772). 
 103. See Flavin & Corrigan, supra note 102, at 862-63 (stating that the mail fraud statute 
“has traditionally been utilized more frequently than its wire fraud companion”). 
 104. 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2012). 
 105. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 527 F.3d 1235, 1241 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding 
that each interstate wire transmission constitutes a separate offense); United States v. 
Garlick, 240 F.3d 789, 792 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Insofar as we have never expressly held that 
each use of the wires constitutes a separate violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343, we do so now.”); 
United States v. Luongo, 11 F.3d 7, 9 (1st Cir. 1993) (“‘It is well established that each use of 
the wires constitutes a separate crime . . . .’”) (quoting United States v. Fermin Castillo, 829 
F.2d 1194, 1199 (1st Cir. 1987)); United States v. Syal, 963 F.2d 900, 907 (6th Cir. 1992) 
(rejecting multiplicity challenge to multiple wire fraud counts); United States v. St. Gelais, 
952 F.2d 90, 96-97 (5th Cir. 1992) (“Each wire transmission in furtherance of a scheme to 
defraud constitutes a separate crime.”); United States v. Heffington, 682 F.2d 1075, 1081 
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statute’s unit of prosecution is faulty, application of the same unit of 
prosecution to the wire fraud statute is likewise without salvation. 
While the legislative history is sparse, Congress enacted the wire fraud 
statute in 1952 and explicitly modeled it after the mail fraud statute.106  The 
statutory language was identical in all principal respects, save the 
jurisdictional element.107  Whereas the mail fraud statute premised federal 
jurisdiction on the use of the United States mails originally, and recently 
added use of a private or commercial interstate carrier, the wire fraud 
statute rests federal jurisdiction upon the Commerce Clause and the actual 
crossing of state lines.108  The statutes are considered so identical in all 
material respects, however, that cases ruling on one statute constitute 
authority with respect to the other.109   
                                                                                                                 
(5th Cir. 1982) (“The law is clear, however, that each separate use of wire communications 
constitutes a separate offense under § 1343.”); United States v. Giovengo, 637 F.2d 941, 
943-44 (3d Cir. 1980) (finding the wire fraud statute to be in pari materia with mail fraud 
and consequently giving wire fraud statute broad construction); United States v. Calvert, 523 
F.2d 895, 903 n.6 (8th Cir. 1975) (finding that each use of wires constitutes a separate 
offense, just like each use of mails); Henderson v. United States, 425 F.2d 134, 138 n.4 (5th 
Cir. 1970) (allowing separate counts for multiple uses of wires in construction fraud). 
 106. See S. REP. NO. 44, at 14 (1951) (stating 18 U.S.C. § 1344 was designed as “a 
parallel [to the] provision now in the law for fraud by mail”). 
 107. Compare the mail fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1341, to the wire fraud statute, 18 
U.S.C. § 1343.  The operative language, “Whoever, having devised or intending to devise 
any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or 
fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises,” is identical and is followed a reference to 
the means of executing the fraud, either by use of the mails or by a wire transmission. 
 108. Thus, while one may violate the mail fraud statute though the letter may never leave 
the state, to violate the wire fraud statute, the wire communication must actually cross state 
lines. See, e.g., United States v. Schaefer, 501 F.3d 1197, 1202 (10th Cir. 2007) (holding the 
wire fraud statute requires wire communication cross state lines), overruled on other 
grounds by United States v. Sturm, 672 F.3d 891 (10th Cir. 2012); United States v. Izydore, 
167 F.3d 213, 219 (5th Cir. 1999) (reversing conviction on wire fraud count where there was 
no evidence the phone call crossed state lines); United States v. Cardall, 885 F.2d 656, 675 
(10th Cir. 1989) (finding that the government proved wire communication crossed state 
lines); Smith v. Ayres, 845 F.2d 1360, 1366 (5th Cir. 1988) (stating that the language in the 
wire fraud statute requires wire communication cross state lines). 
 109. See Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 25 n.6 (1987) (“The mail and wire 
fraud statutes share the same language in relevant part, and accordingly we apply the same 
analysis to both sets of offenses here.”); see also Garlick, 240 F.3d at 793 (relying on 
authority from mail fraud statutes in ruling on wire fraud case); United States v. Mills, 199 
F.3d 184, 188 (5th Cir. 1999) (applying mail fraud case law to wire fraud case); United 
States v. Manarite, 44 F.3d 1407, 1411 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995) (“[T]he mail fraud and wire fraud 
statutes ‘share identical language,’ . . . so [the] wire fraud statute is read in light of the case 
law on mail fraud.”); Belt v. United States, 868 F.2d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 1989) (stating 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2013
306 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:287 
 
 
The principle that each use of the wires constitutes a separate offense is 
not premised upon a careful analysis of the wire fraud statute itself, but, 
rather, it was simply applied to the wire fraud statute because it was the 
accepted rule under the mail fraud statute.  Wire fraud cases that hold each 
wiring constitutes a separate offense cite to mail fraud cases holding that 
each mailing constitutes a separate offense,110 which was shown above to 
be based on Ex parte Henry.111  Because it has been demonstrated above 
that the principle of separate offenses for each mailing is flawed because 
the mail fraud statute has changed over time, the same principle with 
respect to wire communications is equally flawed.  In fact, it is even more 
flawed.  
The original logic for concluding each mailing should constitute a 
separate offense was that each mailing was a separate abuse of the United 
States mail, property of the United States government.112  That logic simply 
does not apply to the use of the wires.  The wires are not government 
property.  As a result, jurisdiction for the wire fraud statute is premised on 
                                                                                                                 
that the wire fraud statute and the mail fraud statute “are given a similar construction and are 
subject to the same substantive analysis”); Hofstetter v. Fletcher, 905 F.2d 897, 902 (6th Cir. 
1988) (treating the mail and wire fraud statutes in a parallel fashion). 
 110. This point can be demonstrated again (for the original demonstration, see supra note 
105) by tracing the authority that courts have cited for the proposition that each use of the 
wires constitutes a separate offense.   
The Luongo court cites United States v. Fermin Castillo, 829 F.2d 1194, 1199 (1st Cir. 
1987), for its authority, which in turn cites United States v. Calvert, 523 F.2d 895, 903 n.6 
(8th Cir. 1975), which in turn relies upon Henderson v. United States, 425 F.2d 134, 138 n. 4 
(5th Cir. 1970), which cites for authority two cases, Atkinson v. United States, 418 F.2d 
1311, 1313 (8th Cir. 1969), which involved mail fraud and not wire fraud, and Sibley v. 
United States, 344 F.2d 103, 105 (5th Cir. 1965), which relies on United States v. Freeling, 
31 F.R.D. 540, 549 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).  The Freeling court did not rely on any other authority, 
but rather, reasoned that it was “difficult to fathom” why, because each separate mailing 
constitutes a separate offense, the same rule ought not to apply to the wire fraud statute 
because they use identical language. 
The Syal Court cites two cases for authority, United States v. Stull, 743 F.2d 439 (6th Cir. 
1984), a mail fraud case, and Fermin Castillo, whose history is treated above. 
The St. Gelais court cites United States v. Blankenship, 746 F.2d 233, 236 (5th Cir. 
1984), a mail fraud case, to support its conclusion that each wire transmission constitutes a 
separate offense. 
The Heffington court cites two cases for authority, United States v. Crockett, 534 F.2d 
589 (5th Cir. 1976), which involved no wire fraud charges but only mail fraud charges, and 
Henderson, which as discussed above traces its authority back to the district court’s 
reasoning in Freeling that what was good for the goose was good for the gander. 
 111. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.  
 112. See supra text accompanying notes 29-45. 
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the Commerce Clause.113  Thus, whether one uses the wires once or 
multiple times to perpetrate a fraud, each use of the wire does not infringe 
upon United States property.  It is even clearer, therefore, that the gist of the 
wire fraud statute is not each use of the wires, but the fraudulent scheme 
itself.114  The use of the wires is only a jurisdictional hook to allow for 
federal prosecution of a fraudulent scheme that involved use of the wires. 
III. Comparison of Other Statutes Involving Schemes or Artifices to 
Defraud 
In order to fully comprehend why the gist of the mail and wire fraud 
statutes should be the fraudulent scheme, it is helpful to consider other 
criminal statutes where Congress has used the phrase “scheme or artifice to 
defraud.” 
Congress has enacted almost a dozen statutes where it has used that 
phrase.115  Several of those statutes are criminal statutes where it is 
necessary to determine the unit of prosecution.  In other words, the statutes 
fail to define whether the unit of prosecution is the fraudulent scheme itself, 
or some act, like mailing or wiring, in furtherance of the scheme.  Courts 
have been inconsistent in determining the unit of prosecution for these 
statutes, even though most were explicitly modeled on the mail fraud 
statute.116  Among those are the securities fraud, bank fraud, and 
bankruptcy fraud statutes.   
  
                                                                                                                 
 113. See, e.g., United States v. Louper-Morris, 672 F.3d 539, 563 (8th Cir. 2012); United 
States v. Hook, 195 F.3d 299, 310 (7th Cir. 1999); United States v. Darby, 37 F.3d 1059, 
1067 (4th Cir. 1994). 
 114. See United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 943 (4th Cir. 1995) (“[T]he gravamen of 
the offense of wire fraud is simply the execution of a scheme to defraud.”), abrogated on 
other grounds by United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997). 
 115. Congress has used the phrase “scheme or artifice to defraud” in multiple statutes. 
See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 6o(1)(A) (2012) (commodity trading advisors, commodity pool 
operators, and associated persons); 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(1) (2012) (sales of securities); 15 
U.S.C. § 78jjj(c)(1)(A) (2012) (liquidation proceedings or direct payment procedures by 
broker-dealers); 15 U.S.C. § 1703(a)(2)(A) (2012) (interstate land sales); 15 U.S.C. § 80b-
6(1) (2012) (investment advisors); 18 U.S.C. § 157 (2012) (bankruptcy fraud); 18 U.S.C. § 
981(a)(1)(E) (2012) (civil forfeiture); 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(4) (2012) (criminal forfeiture); 18 
U.S.C. § 1343 (2012) (wire fraud); and 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (2012) (transportation of stolen 
goods, securities, etc.).  
 116. See infra Part III.A-C. 
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A. Securities Fraud Statute 
The securities fraud statute117 is particularly instructive because it 
contains a mailing element very similar to the mailing element in the mail 
fraud statute.118  Securities fraud occurs when false or misleading 
statements are used in connection with the purchase or sale of securities.119  
Again, the statutory language is slightly different from that used in the mail 
fraud statute.  The actus reus, that is the act which makes it a crime, is the 
“use” or “employment” of a manipulative or deceptive device in connection 
with the purchase or sale of securities.120  The use of interstate commerce or 
the mails to execute the scheme provides the basis for federal 
jurisdiction.121  Thus, the appropriate unit of prosecution is the purchase or 
sale of a security, not the mailing.122  In securities fraud cases, the mailing 
element serves merely a jurisdictional purpose.123  Several purchases or 
sales may be made within a single manipulative scheme and each may 
constitute a separate offense if each was made using a false statement of 
material fact.124  Therefore, the unit of prosecution is neither the “scheme” 
                                                                                                                 
 117. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012).  This article references the securities fraud statute 
enacted by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.  For purposes of the unit of prosecution 
analysis addressed in this article, the 1933 Act contains substantially identical language 
regarding the unit of prosecution.  
 118. 15 U.S.C. § 78j.  The Securities Exchange Commission promulgated regulation 10b-
5, directed at securities fraud, which further speaks in terms of schemes or artifices to 
defraud.  17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2012). 
 119. See Belmont v. MB Inv. Partners, Inc., 708 F.3d 470, 493 (3d Cir. 2013) (“To make 
out a securities fraud claim under Rule 10b-5, a plaintiff must show [inter alia] that the 
defendant made a materially false or misleading statement or omitted to state a material fact 
necessary to make a statement not misleading . . . .”) (internal quotation and citation 
omitted). 
 120. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b). 
 121. See United States v. Langford, 946 F.2d 798, 803 n.20 (11th Cir. 1991) (finding 
mailing element only jurisdictional).   
 122. Id. at 804; United States v. Rigas, 281 F. Supp. 2d 660, 667 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) 
(finding the unit of prosecution under the securities fraud statute is any transaction 
connected to the purchase or sale of a security).  But see United States v. Mackay, 491 F.2d 
616, 619 (10th Cir. 1974) (“The jurisdictional basis [under both securities fraud and mail 
fraud] is . . . the use of the mails or an instrumentality of commerce and as such each mailing 
is regarded as a separate crime even though it relates to essentially the same fraudulent 
scheme.”).  The Langford court points out that the Mackay court only cited two mail fraud 
cases in support of its holding.  Langford, 946 F.2d at 804 n.23. 
 123. Langford, 946 F.2d at 803 n.20 (finding the legislative history of 15 U.S.C. § 78j 
limits scope to “transactions effected by the use of the mails,” relegating use of mails to a 
merely jurisdictional function). 
 124. Id. at 803. 
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nor each mailing, but the purchase or sale of a security.125  Of course, this 
requires courts to carefully evaluate the scope of the scheme to defraud on a 
case-by-case basis. 
Thus, under the securities fraud statute the courts have determined the 
unit of prosecution based upon the essence of the criminal conduct, that is, 
the execution of the fraudulent scheme.  In contrast to the mail fraud 
statute, courts have not concluded that each mailing in furtherance of a 
securities fraud scheme constitutes a separate offense.  This highlights the 
shortcoming of mail fraud jurisprudence’s focus on the basis of federal 
jurisdiction to determine the unit of prosecution. 
B. The Bank Fraud Statute 
In 1984, Congress enacted the bank fraud statute126 in response to the 
savings and loan crisis to address gaps in federal jurisdiction regarding 
frauds upon financial institutions.127  Congress modeled the statute after the 
mail and wire fraud statutes.128  Jurisdiction for the mail fraud statute, 
however, is based on the Postal Power Clause and the Commerce Clause, 
the wire fraud statute is based on the Commerce Clause, but the bank fraud 
statute is based on the involvement of federal property in the form of 
federal insurance on deposits.129   
                                                                                                                 
 125. Id. Courts have reached the same conclusion with respect to 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a), 
which provides: 
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities . . . by 
the use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in 
interstate commerce or by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly-- 
 (1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or 
 (2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a 
material fact . . .  necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light 
of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading; or 
 (3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which 
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser. 
15 U.S.C. § 77q(a); see United States v. Ashdown, 509 F.2d 793, 800 (5th Cir. 1975). 
 126. 18 U.S.C. § 1344 (2012). 
 127. S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 378 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3519. 
 128. Id.; see also United States v. Solomonson, 908 F.2d 358, 364 (8th Cir. 1990) 
(“Section 1344 was modeled after the mail and wire fraud statutes.”); United States v. 
Bonallo, 858 F.2d 1427, 1432-33 (9th Cir. 1988) (noting that the Senate Report stated that 
the bank fraud statute is modeled after the mail fraud statute, and that the House Judiciary 
Committee, in considering the bank fraud statute, endorsed the broad reading given to mail 
fraud). 
 129. S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 378-79 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 31282, 3519.  
Though the 1989 amendment to the bank fraud statute deleted specific references to 
“federally chartered or insured financial institution” (see Act of Aug. 9, 1989, Pub. L. 101-
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Initially courts followed the case law with respect to the unit of 
prosecution under those statutes and found that each financial transaction in 
furtherance of a bank fraud scheme constituted a separate offense, 
recognizing the bank fraud statute was modeled on the mail fraud and wire 
fraud statutes.130  That changed, however, with later decisions.131  In 
interpreting the bank fraud statute, courts have held that each “execution of 
a scheme to defraud” constitutes a separate offense, not each financial 
transaction made in furtherance of the scheme.132  Thus, the critical task for 
a court is defining the scope of the fraudulent scheme.133  The resolution of 
this issue turns on such fact specific inquiries as whether the loans in 
question were related, whether they came from a single bank, and the 
number of movements of money.134   
                                                                                                                 
73, 103 Stat. 183), it is still necessary to show it as the basis for federal jurisdiction. See, 
e.g., United States v. Flanders, 491 F.3d 1197, 1208 (10th Cir. 2007) (including as an 
element of the offense of willful misapplication of funds a requirement to show the bank 
involved in the fraud was federally insured); United States v. Ragosta, 970 F.2d 1085, 1089 
n.1 (2d Cir. 1992) (explaining that the elements of the offense include showing the financial 
institution was federally chartered or insured). 
 130. See, e.g., United States v. Mason, 902 F.2d 1434, 1437-38 (9th Cir. 1990) (stating 
that each check drawn on account constituted a separate offense in furtherance of fraud 
scheme), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Doe, 705 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir. 
2013); United States v. Schwartz, 899 F.2d 243, 248 (3d Cir. 1990) (noting that each deposit 
constituted a separate offense in furtherance of fraud scheme); Poliak, 823 F.2d at 372 
(finding language of 18 U.S.C. § 1344 “plainly and unambiguously allows charging each 
execution of the scheme to defraud as a separate act”). 
 131. The change started with the decision in United States v. Lemons, in which the Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals distinguished the mail fraud and wire fraud statutory language from 
the bank fraud statutory language and held that the unit of prosecution for purposes of the 
bank fraud statute was the “scheme” itself, not each financial transaction made in 
furtherance of the scheme. 941 F.2d 309 (5th Cir. 1991). 
 132. See, e.g., United States v. Wall, 37 F.3d 1443, 1446 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding that 
each of multiple loans from a single institution fraudulently obtained as part of common 
scheme to raise money constituted separate offenses because each loan created a separate 
risk to the bank); United States v. Rimell, 21 F.3d 281, 287 (8th Cir. 1994) (“[E]ach separate 
execution of a scheme to defraud may be pled as a distinct count of the indictment.”); United 
States v. Brandon, 17 F.3d 409, 422 (1st Cir. 1994) (finding that each loan based on 
fraudulent, over-valued appraisals constituted separate offenses); United States v. Heath, 970 
F.2d 1397, 1401-02 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that two loans taken out in furtherance of single 
scheme to defraud bank out of ten million dollars constituted one offense of bank fraud); 
Lemons, 941 F.2d at 314 (finding that several transfers of funds in furtherance of single 
scheme to defraud constituted a single offense). 
 133. Wall, 37 F.3d at 1446; United States v. Barnhart, 979 F.2d 647, 651 (8th Cir. 1992). 
 134. See Wall, 37 F.3d at 1446 (reviewing cases evaluating various such factors in 
determining the scope of the scheme to defraud); Brandon, 17 F.3d at 422 (same). 
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 As to the unit of prosecution, in distinguishing the bank fraud statute 
from the mail and wire fraud statutes courts have focused on the statutory 
language.135  The mail fraud statute speaks in terms of using the mail to 
execute a scheme to defraud, whereas the bank fraud statute speaks in terms 
of executing a scheme to defraud using financial transactions.136  Thus, 
courts conclude executing the scheme to defraud is the focus of the bank 
fraud statute.137  This is a legitimate distinction based on subtle differences 
in the statutory language.  This begs the primary question raised by this 
article: whether the mail fraud statute should be reworded to mirror similar 
statutes that focus the unit of prosecution on the execution of the scheme to 
defraud.     
C. Bankruptcy Fraud 
In 1994, Congress criminalized engagement in a scheme or artifice to 
defraud in relation to a bankruptcy matter.138  There are three subsections to 
the bankruptcy fraud statute.139  A person who has devised a scheme or 
                                                                                                                 
 135. See United States v. Wiehl, 904 F. Supp. 81, 86-87 (N.D.N.Y. 1995) (distinguishing 
the unit of prosecution under the mail fraud statute from the unit of prosecution under the 
major fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1031, based on nuances in the statutory language, 
supporting its conclusion by comparison to the statutory language of the bank fraud statute). 
 136. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012) (“Whoever, having devised . . . any scheme or 
artifice to defraud . . . for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice . . . places in any 
post office . . . any matter or thing whatever [shall be punished].”), with 18 U.S.C. § 1344 
(2012) (“Whoever knowingly executes . . . a scheme or artifice . . . to defraud [shall be 
punished].”). 
 137. See, e.g., United States v. De La Mata, 266 F.3d 1275, 1287 (11th Cir. 2001) (“The 
unit of the offense created by § 1344 is each execution or attempted execution of the scheme 
to defraud, not each act in furtherance thereof.”) (citations omitted); Lemons, 941 F.2d at 
317 (finding that bank fraud language prohibiting the “execution” of a fraudulent scheme 
sufficient to distinguish it from the mail fraud statute’s language prohibiting “devising” 
fraudulent schemes); Heath, 970 F.2d at 1402 (same). 
 138. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 312, 108 Stat. 4106, 4138. 
 139. 18 U.S.C. § 157 provides: 
A person who, having devised or intending to devise a scheme or artifice to 
defraud and for the purpose of executing or concealing such a scheme or 
artifice or attempting to do so-- 
 [1]. Files a petition under title 11 . . .; 
 2. [F]iles a document in a proceeding under title 11; or 
 3. [M]akes a false or fraudulent representation, claim, or promise concerning or 
in relation to a proceeding under title 11, at any time before or after the filing of 
a petition, or in relation to a proceeding falsely asserted to be pending under 
such title shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 5 years, or 
both. 
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artifice to defraud violates the bankruptcy fraud act if, for the purpose of 
executing or concealing the fraudulent scheme, the person: (1) files a 
bankruptcy petition;140 (2) files a document with the bankruptcy court;141 or 
(3) makes a false or fraudulent representation concerning or in relation to a 
bankruptcy proceeding.142 Neither the first nor second subsection requires 
that the petition or pleading itself be false, fraudulent, or misleading.143  In 
drafting the bankruptcy fraud statute, Congress modeled it after the mail 
fraud statute.144  Indeed, the language very closely resembles that of the 
mail fraud statute.  It contains similar introductory, dependent language 
regarding a requirement that someone have devised a scheme to defraud.145   
Though there is a paucity of case law interpreting this statute, it has now 
been law for fifteen years.  Most courts have interpreted the bankruptcy 
                                                                                                                 
18 U.S.C. § 157 (2010). 
 140. See, e.g., United States v. Wagner, 382 F.3d 598, 612 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that 
the first subsection of § 157 has three elements: “1) the existence of a scheme to defraud or 
intent to later formulate a scheme to defraud and 2) the filing of a bankruptcy petition 3) for 
the purpose of executing or attempting to execute the scheme”) (quoting United States v. 
DeSantis, 237 F.3d 607, 613 (6th Cir. 2001). 
 141. See id. (stating that the second subsection of § 157 has elements identical to the first 
except that it requires the filing of a document in a proceeding under Title 11). 
 142. DeSantis, 237 F.3d at 613. 
 143. See Wagner, 382 F.3d at 612 (setting forth elements of bankruptcy fraud under the 
first two elements). 
 144. 140 CONG. REC. H10752-01, at H10773 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1994) (statement of Rep. 
Howard Berman); see also Wagner, 382 F.3d at 613 n.3 (looking to analysis of the mail and 
wire fraud statutes in holding that actual reliance on the scheme to defraud is not an essential 
element of the crime); United States v. Daniels, 247 F.3d 598, 600 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing the 
constitutionality of the mail fraud statute in holding the holding the bankruptcy fraud statute 
constitutional); 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 7.07[1][a], at 7-119 (Alan N. Resnick et al. 
eds., 16th ed. 2009) (“Section 157 is consciously patterned on the federal mail fraud 
statute.”). 
 145. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012) (“Whoever, having devised or intending to devise 
any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or 
fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, or to sell, dispose of, loan, exchange, 
alter, give away, distribute, supply, or furnish or procure for unlawful use any counterfeit or 
spurious coin, obligation, security, or other article, or anything represented to be or intimated 
or held out to be such counterfeit or spurious article, for the purpose of executing such 
scheme or artifice or attempting so to do.”) (emphasis added), with 18 U.S.C. § 157 (2012) 
(“A person who, having devised or intending to devise a scheme or artifice to defraud and 
for the purpose of executing or concealing such a scheme or artifice or attempting to do 
so.”).  Indeed, but for the McNally-fix language regarding intangible rights and archaic 
language regarding “spurious” items, the language is virtually identical. 
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fraud statute by borrowing court interpretation of the mail fraud statute.146  
Nevertheless, what little case law exists demonstrates courts have been 
inconsistent in determining the unit of prosecution.  For example, one 
federal circuit court held that each bankruptcy filing made in relation to a 
scheme to defraud is a separate violation of § 157.147  Another appellate 
court, however, found multiple bankruptcy filings made in relation to a 
scheme to defraud to be a single violation of § 157.148  
In light of the case law comparing the statutory language of the bank 
fraud statute with that of the mail fraud statute, it would seem that the 
bankruptcy fraud statutory construction would track the mail fraud statutory 
construction.  That is, because the mail fraud and bankruptcy fraud 
statutory language both emphasize the method by which the fraudulent 
scheme is executed and not the execution of the scheme itself, the unit of 
prosecution under the bankruptcy fraud statute would have to be each 
petition or document filed.  Following this logic, though there be but one 
fraudulent scheme to defraud, under the bankruptcy fraud statute it would 
be a separate crime each time a petition or other document is filed in 
bankruptcy court. 
Should this be the case?  When a person engages in a fraudulent scheme 
in connection with a bankruptcy case, the number of documents that happen 
to be filed in connection with the bankruptcy may have nothing to do with 
the extent or nature of the fraudulent conduct.  Under the first two 
subsections of the bankruptcy fraud statute, the petition or document filed 
with the court need not itself be fraudulent.149  Thus, the number of 
documents filed may have no relationship at all with the defendant’s 
criminal culpability.  Yet, if the courts follow the statutory construction, 
                                                                                                                 
 146. See United States v. Milwitt, 475 F.3d 1150, 1155 n.5 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Most of the 
few courts that have interpreted 18 U.S.C. § 157 have looked to 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 and 1343 
for guidance” and collecting cases and authorities). 
 147. See DeSantis, 237 F.3d at 613 (holding that if a defendant, having devised a scheme 
to defraud and filed a bankruptcy petition with the purpose of executing a scheme to defraud, 
had undertaken a variety of other acts, such as filing a reorganization plan or making a false 
statement in a meeting of creditors, for the purpose of executing the scheme, he would be 
subject to additional counts of § 157). 
 148. See United States v. Naegele, 341 B.R. 349, 364 (D.D.C. 2006) (finding indictment 
which charged a violation of § 157 not improper because, while it alleged a number of acts 
in furtherance of a single scheme to defraud, they were set out in a “manner and means” 
section of the indictment and were not alleged as additional counts). 
 149. See Wagner, 382 F.3d at 612 (setting forth the elements of the first two subsections 
of § 157). 
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given the almost identical language of the mail fraud statute, courts would 
have to conclude that each filing constitutes a separate offense.   
A comparison of multiple other fraud statutes, each modeled after the 
mail fraud statute, reflects a multitude of conclusions as to the appropriate 
unit of prosecution.  Although different conclusions might find support 
based in subtleties in statutory language, the previous discussion shows that 
these may be distinctions without differences.  Moreover, it is only with 
regard to the mail fraud statute, and its companion wire fraud statute, that 
courts still cling to the conclusion that the unit of prosecution should be 
based on the act giving rise to federal jurisdiction.  A consistent approach 
across the “scheme to defraud” statutes is needed. 
IV. The Unit of Prosecution Under the Mail Fraud Statute Should Not Be 
the Use of the Mails 
The analysis of the mail fraud statute’s evolution shows its shift from a 
statute based on the Postal Power Clause and designed to protect the United 
States Postal Service from abuse, to a statute based on both the Postal 
Power and Commerce Clauses designed to protect people from fraudulent 
schemes where mailings are used to execute the fraudulent scheme.  This 
leads to the conclusion that the tired truism that each mailing automatically 
constitutes a separate offense should be rejected.  Established precedent, 
however, now precludes courts from determining anew whether each 
mailing should constitute a separate offense of the mail fraud statute or 
whether there is a more appropriate unit of prosecution.150  Changing the 
unit of prosecution would require district courts to untether themselves 
from to the Ex parte Henry holding, flout binding precedent, and analyze 
the nature of the offense itself to determine whether charging each mailing 
as a separate offense is the appropriate unit of prosecution.  Accordingly, a 
legislative fix is the only option to clarify its intended unit of prosecution. 
A. Why It Is Important to Determine the Unit of Prosecution 
Determining the unit of prosecution is important to determine whether an 
indictment is multiplicitous.  Treating each mailing as a separate offense 
makes application of the mail fraud statute potentially overinclusive in the 
sense that it can include, as separate criminal offenses, conduct which is in 
furtherance of a single criminal offense.  Charging the same criminal 
                                                                                                                 
 150. See Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212 (1984) (holding that stare decisis, the 
policy of courts to stand by precedent and not to disturb a settled point, is to be followed 
absent “special justification”).  
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behavior in several counts constitutes multiplicity.151  Determining whether 
counts are multiplicitous turns on what Congress intended as the 
appropriate unit of prosecution.152  Multiplicity analysis therefore requires 
an evaluation of the statute and its legislative history to determine the 
gravamen of the offense,153 even if each charge appears to require proof of 
different facts.154  Unless Congress has clearly and unequivocally indicated 
that each act constitutes a separate offense, the rule of lenity, which requires 
“ambiguous criminal laws to be interpreted in favor of the defendants 
                                                                                                                 
 151. See United States v. Fleming, 19 F.3d 1325, 1330 (10th Cir. 1994) (“[M]ultiplicity 
refers to multiple counts of an indictment which cover the same criminal behavior.”) 
(quoting United States v. Dashney, 937 F.2d 532, 540 n.7 (10th Cir. 1991)); United States v. 
Allen, 13 F.3d 105, 107 (4th Cir. 1993) (defining multiplicity as “the charging of each act in 
a series of identical acts as though it were a separate crime”); United States v. Rimell, 21 
F.3d 281, 287 (8th Cir. 1994) (“An indictment which charges a single offense in multiple 
counts is multiplicitous.”); United States v. Langford, 946 F.2d 798, 802 (11th Cir. 1991) 
(“Multiplicity is the charging of a single offense in more than one count.”); see also 1A 
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ANDREW D. LEIPOLD, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: 
CRIMINAL § 142 (4th ed. 2008) (“[M]ultiplicity is charging a single offense in several 
counts.”). 
 152. See Langford, 946 F.2d at 802 (“To determine whether an indictment is 
multiplicitous, we first determine the allowable unit of prosecution.”). 
 153. See United States v. Christner, 66 F.3d 922, 927 (8th Cir. 1995) (“The yardstick in 
determining whether there is  . . . multiplicity is whether one offense or separate offenses are 
charged, and . . . this is a difficult and subtle question.  The test announced most often in 
cases is that offenses are separate if each requires proof of an additional fact that the other 
does not.  This seems of little value as a test.  The real question is one of legislative intent, to 
be ascertained from all the data available.”) (quoting 1 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 142 (2d ed. 1982)); United States v. Bennett, 44 F.3d 1364, 
1373 (8th Cir. 1995) (“First, a court must ask whether Congress ‘intended that each violation 
be a separate offense.’ If it did not, there is no statutory basis for the two prosecutions, and 
the double jeopardy inquiry is at an end. Second, if Congress intended separate prosecutions, 
a court must then determine whether the relevant offenses constitute the ‘same offense’ 
within the meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause.”) (citations omitted); United States v. 
Meuli, 8 F.3d 1481, 1485 (10th Cir. 1993) (“In reviewing multiplicity claims we look to the 
language of the statute to determine whether Congress intended multiple convictions and 
sentences under the statute.”); see also WRIGHT, supra note 151, § 142 (“[A]t its core, the 
issue of duplicity or multiplicity is one of statutory interpretation.”).  But see Iannelli v. 
United States, 420 U.S. 770, 785 n.17 (1975) (noting that offenses are considered separate, 
and therefore not multiplicitous, if each requires proof of a fact not common to the others).  
 154. See, e.g., United States v. Woodward, 469 U.S. 105, 108-10 (1985) (per curiam) 
(reviewing legislative history to determine congressional intent regarding statutes which, on 
their face, required proof of different facts); Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 340-42 
(1981) (explaining that the Blockburger test for Double Jeopardy Clause violations is merely 
a rule of statutory construction, thus making analysis of legislative history necessary to 
determine congressional intent if possible). 
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subjected to them,”155 suggests courts should find a single offense.156  The 
rule of lenity comes into play, however, only when a statute is deemed 
ambiguous.157  Courts have rejected application of the rule in multiplicity 
challenges to the mail and wire fraud statutes by merely repeating the 
truism that each mailing or use of the wires constitutes a separate offense.158 
Determining the appropriate unit of prosecution under the mail fraud and 
wire fraud statutes is more than an academic exercise.  First, multiplicity 
poses the danger of imposing multiple sentences for a single offense159 in 
violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution.  The Double Jeopardy Clause provides that no 
person shall “be subject for the same offence [sic] to be twice put in 
jeopardy of life or limb.”160  When each mailing is a separate offense, 
multiple charges for multiple mailings do not violate the Double Jeopardy 
Clause.  If this is wrong, however, and each mailing should not constitute a 
separate offense, then multiple charges for multiple mailings could violate 
the Double Jeopardy Clause. 
Second, charging a defendant in multiple counts for a single offense may 
improperly “suggest to the jury that the defendant committed more than one 
                                                                                                                 
 155. See United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 514 (2008).   
 156. See Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971) (“[A]mbiguity concerning the 
ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity.”); Bell v. United States, 349 
U.S. 81, 84 (1955) (“[I]f Congress does not fix the punishment for a federal offense clearly 
and without ambiguity, doubt will be resolved against turning a single transaction into 
multiple offenses . . . .”); see also United States v. Polouizzi, 564 F.3d 142, 158 (2d Cir. 
2009) (finding the rule of lenity forbids treating as multiple offenses each child pornographic 
image received in a single transaction because congressional intent as to the unit of 
prosecution was ambiguous); United States v. Vargas-Castillo, 329 F.3d 715, 721-22 (9th 
Cir. 2003) (stating that the rule of lenity was not violated with regard to indictment on two 
charges of importation and possession of cocaine and marijuana because Congress 
unambiguously intended for each controlled substance to be a unit of prosecution).   
 157. Bifulco, 447 U.S. at 387.  
 158. See, e.g., United States v. Luongo, 11 F.3d 7, 9 n.6 (1st Cir. 1993) (“As the wire 
fraud statute is unambiguous, and the principle that each use of the wires constitutes a 
separate violation of section 1343 has been widely accepted for many years, we have no 
occasion to engage the rule of lenity.”) (citations omitted). 
 159. See United States v. Christner, 66 F.3d 922, 927 (8th Cir. 1995); United States v. 
Brandon, 17 F.3d 409, 422 (1st Cir. 1994); United States v. Haddock, 956 F.2d 1534, 1546 
(10th Cir. 1992), abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482 
(1997); United States v. Langford, 946 F.2d 798, 802 (11th Cir. 1991); United States v. 
Duncan, 850 F.2d 1104, 1108 n.4 (6th Cir. 1988), overruled on other grounds by Schad v. 
Arizona, 501 U.S. 624 (1991); United States v. Hearod, 499 F.2d 1003, 1005 (5th Cir. 1974). 
 160. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
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crime” for the purpose of trying improperly to influence the jury.161  In 
other words, a large number of charges may give the impression of greater 
criminal activity or culpability than may have actually occurred.162  
Third, multiplicitous counts can create the possibility of compromise 
verdicts in which jurors strike deals to find a defendant guilty of one or 
more counts in exchange for acquitting the defendant on other counts as a 
means of reaching a verdict.163  This is possible if multiple mail fraud 
counts are charged for each mailing, whereas it would not be possible if a 
single mail fraud count reflected the scheme to defraud regardless of the 
number of mailings. 
Fourth, when the government charges multiple counts for acts that 
appear to arise from a single course of conduct, it may create the 
appearance the government did so in an effort to skew plea bargaining.  The 
argument, for example, is that by charging a defendant with thirty counts of 
mail fraud arising from a single fraudulent scheme, which resulted in thirty 
mailings, the government has attempted to intimidate a defendant, creating 
the appearance of greater exposure to criminal liability.164 
Finally, multiplicitous mail fraud or wire fraud charges pose an 
additional, perhaps unique danger, when they are used as predicate acts for 
a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) charge.  Under 
the RICO Act, prosecutors must prove two or more predicate violations of 
specific federal and state crimes set forth in the statute.165  Mail fraud and 
                                                                                                                 
 161. See Christner, 66 F.3d at 927 (quoting United States v. Dixon, 921 F.2d 194, 196 
(8th Cir. 1990)).   
 162. See, e.g., Langford, 946 F.2d at 802 (“[A] multiplicitous indictment may improperly 
prejudice a jury by suggesting that a defendant has committed several crimes -- not one.”) 
(citing United States v. Reed, 639 F.2d 896, 904 (2d Cir. 1981)); Duncan, 850 F.2d at 1108 
n.4 (holding that multiplicity poses the danger that “prolix recitation may falsely suggest to a 
jury that a defendant has committed not one but several crimes.”); United States v. 
Marquardt, 786 F.2d 771, 778 (7th Cir. 1986) (noting that multiplicity creates a danger of 
prejudicing jury against defendant by creating impression of more criminal activity than 
what actually occurred); Reed, 639 F.2d at 904 (stating that one vice of multiplicity is that it 
“may improperly prejudice a jury by suggesting that a defendant has committed not one but 
several crimes”) (citing United States v. Carter, 576 F.2d 1061, 1064 (3d Cir. 1978)). 
 163. See also Michael L. Seigel & Christopher Slobogin, Prosecuting Martha: Federal 
Prosecutorial Power and the Need for a Law of Counts, 109 PENN ST. L. REV. 1107, 1125-
26 (2005). 
 164. See id. at 1126-27. 
 165. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (2012); see also United States v. Tello, 687 F.3d 785, 792 
(7th Cir. 2012) (holding that to violate the RICO statute, “an individual must, among other 
things, participate in two or more predicate acts of racketeering”). 
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wire fraud violations constitute predicate offenses under the RICO statute166 
and are often used as predicate offenses in RICO prosecutions.167  If a 
RICO charge is based upon alleged multiple violations of the mail fraud 
statute then, when multiple mailings were made in execution of a single 
scheme to defraud, a defendant may wrongfully be convicted of violating 
RICO.168  For example, courts have recognized that multiple mail and wire 
fraud charges pose a unique danger when used as predicate offenses under 
RICO because the number of charges seldom correlates directly to a real 
pattern of racketeering activity.169  If each mailing or wiring would no 
longer constitute a separate offense, it would eliminate this potential 
problem with using mail and wire fraud offenses as predicate acts under the 
RICO statute. 
Although the mail and wire fraud statutes are overinclusive, treating each 
mailing or each wiring as a separate offense can be underinclusive by 
operation of the five-year statute of limitations.170  Because the mailing or 
wiring is the unit of prosecution under the mail and wire fraud statutes, “the 
statute of limitations . . . runs from the date of [the last mailing or wiring] in 
                                                                                                                 
 166. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1). 
 167. See, e.g., Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12, 25 (2000) (mail fraud); United 
States v. Whitfield, 590 F.3d 325, 342 (5th Cir. 2009) (wire fraud); United States v. Ganim, 
510 F.3d 134, 140-41 (2d Cir. 2007) (mail fraud); United States v. Johnson, 440 F.3d 832, 
837 (6th Cir. 2006) (mail fraud); United States v. Peter, 310 F.3d 709, 711 (11th Cir. 2002) 
(mail fraud). 
 168. See United States v. Horak, 833 F.2d 1235, 1240 (7th Cir. 1987) (noting that 
multiple mailings in furtherance of a single scheme to defraud may not constitute a pattern 
of predicate offenses under the RICO statute, though each mailing may constitute a separate 
offense).  
 169. See Lipin Enters. Inc. v. Lee, 803 F.2d 322, 325 (7th Cir. 1986) (Cudahy, J., 
concurring) (“Mail fraud and wire fraud are perhaps unique among the various sorts of 
‘racketeering activity’ possible under RICO in that the existence of a multiplicity of 
predicate acts . . . may be of no indication of the requisite continuity of the underlying 
fraudulent activity.  Thus, a multiplicity of mailings does not necessarily translate into a 
‘pattern’ of racketeering activity.”); accord Elliott v. Chi. Motor Club Ins., 809 F.2d 347, 
350 (7th Cir. 1986). 
 170. 18 U.S.C. § 3282 provides for a five-year statute of limitations for most federal 
offenses, including mail and wire fraud. See, e.g., United States v. McGowan, 590 F.3d 446, 
456 (7th Cir. 2009); United States v. Pearson, 340 F.3d 459, 464 (7th Cir. 2003); United 
States v. McDonald, 576 F.2d 1350, 1357 (9th Cir. 1978).  18 U.S.C. § 3293(2), however, 
extends the statute of limitations for mail and wire fraud to ten years if the offense affects a 
financial institution. 
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furtherance of the scheme.”171  Thus, the statute of limitations may bar 
prosecutions of ongoing fraudulent schemes simply because the mailing or 
wiring upon which the offense rests occurred outside the statute of 
limitations.   
It is not difficult to imagine a fraudulent scheme that starts with a 
mailing or wiring but that is then executed over some period of time by 
other acts in furtherance of the scheme. For example, a simple scheme to 
defraud might involve a mailing to a victim soliciting money for a fictitious 
charity, followed by a personal visit by the criminal to the home of the 
victim to solicit the charitable contribution.  If the mailing took place five 
years and one day ago, but the personal visit took place four years and 364 
days ago, prosecution under the mail fraud statute would be barred.172  
Were the scheme to defraud the unit of prosecution, on the other hand, then 
the statute of limitations would run from the last act committed in 
furtherance of that scheme.173  This would expand the scope of fraudulent 
schemes that could be charged under the mail and wire fraud statutes. 
Determining the unit of prosecution is not an academic exercise.  It 
implicates defendants’ constitutional rights and can influence everything 
from plea bargaining to the manner in which juries reach their verdicts.  If, 
as this article posits, the real gist of the mail fraud statute is no longer each 
separate mailing made in connection with a scheme to defraud, but rather, 
each execution of a scheme to defraud, then it is important that Congress 
change the statute.  
  
                                                                                                                 
 171. United States v. Eckhardt, 843 F.2d 989, 993 (7th Cir. 1988); see also McDonald, 
576 F.2d at 1357 (finding the statute of limitations for mail fraud runs from last mailing 
made in furtherance of the fraudulent scheme). 
 172. Admittedly, there are no reported decisions where the government’s prosecution of 
a fraudulent scheme was barred in circumstances similar to this hypothetical, but, of course, 
one would not expect there to be.  The government would be unlikely to ever charge this 
conduct knowing that it was barred by the statute of limitations, or if it did, would have the 
case dismissed at the district court level.  
 173. See United States v. Najjor, 255 F.3d 979, 983-84 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding that 
“executing a scheme to defraud” under the bank fraud statute “is a continuing offense” for 
statute of limitations purposes such that the statute of limitations begins to run when the last 
act in furtherance of the scheme is committed); United States v. Anderson, 188 F.3d 886, 
889-90 (7th Cir. 1999) (noting that the defendant’s refinancing of a fraudulent loan within 
five years of the criminal charge brought the fraudulent scheme within the bank fraud statute 
of limitations). 
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B. Reworking the Mail Fraud Statute to Change the Unit of Prosecution 
The gravamen of the mail fraud statute as currently written is the 
execution of the underlying scheme to defraud, not the use of the mails.  
The appropriate unit of prosecution under the mail and wire fraud statutes, 
therefore, should focus on the execution of the scheme to defraud, not on 
the mailings or use of the wires.  Like the bank fraud statute, the unit of 
prosecution should be logically related to the fraudulent scheme.  As 
discussed above, however, courts have seized upon nuanced differences in 
the language of other statutes, such as the bank fraud statute, to determine 
that the unit of prosecution is different.174  It will therefore require a change 
in the mail fraud statute to make it clear that Congress did not intend to 
create different units of prosecution under these similar statutes. 
The conclusion that the mailing is the gist of the mail fraud statute, such 
that each mailing constitutes a separate offense, is a matter of judicial 
misinterpretation of congressional intent.175  To reverse decades of 
precedent misinterpreting congressional intent, therefore, Congress needs to 
clarify the intent of the current version of the mail fraud statute.  Congress 
could recognize the mail fraud statute’s unique history, the evolution of its 
language, and the shift in focus from mailing to the fraudulent scheme and 
abandon the untenable truism that each mailing constitutes a separate 
offense.  Congress could clarify its intent that the gist of the mail fraud 
statute, and its sister the wire fraud statute, is the execution of the scheme to 
defraud. 
Because courts have distinguished the mail fraud statute from other 
similar statutes based on statutory language, the mail fraud jurisprudence 
may be so entrenched that it is unrealistic to expect courts to abandon their 
past reasoning.  Accordingly, it is necessary for Congress to amend the mail 
fraud statute.  This could be accomplished by changing the language “for 
the purpose of executing such a scheme” to “executes such a scheme,” such 
that the language matches that of the bank fraud statute.176  This would 
indicate clear congressional intent to make the scheme to defraud itself the 
gist of the mail fraud and wire fraud statutes and free the courts from the 
burden of its precedent that was based on a prior version of the statute. 
The unit of prosecution test used for mail and wire fraud should be the 
same as used for bank fraud: each execution of a mail or wire fraud scheme 
should constitute a separate offense, regardless of the number of times the 
                                                                                                                 
 174. See supra notes 130-134 and accompanying text. 
 175. See supra Part I. 
 176. See infra Appendix C. 
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mails or wires were used.  In some cases, each mailing may constitute an 
execution of a scheme to defraud, while in other instances multiple mailings 
may simply be multiple acts in furtherance of a single fraudulent scheme.  
The focus should be on the relationship between the mailing (or wire) and 
the fraudulent scheme.177  In determining whether there is one or more 
schemes to defraud, courts should consider such factors as whether the 
mailings were related to or dependent on each other and whether each 
mailing caused, or risked, a separate harm to the victim.   
Though courts do not explicitly list “harm” as a factor for consideration, 
it underlies their analysis in the structuring of bank fraud cases.  For 
example, in addressing the anti-structuring statute, one court determined 
that whether the defendants made a single deposit or hundreds of deposits 
was irrelevant in determining their culpability.178  Similarly, with regard to 
bank fraud, some courts consider whether the act in question created a 
separate risk of harm to the bank.179  The same analysis of harm should be 
applied to the mail fraud statute.  This approach would recognize the fact 
that sometimes multiple mailings create a greater danger of harm, while in 
other cases they do not.180  
                                                                                                                 
 177. For example, a fraudulent mail order scheme whereby each customer is defrauded 
should fairly be considered separate schemes to defraud each customer.  A separate harm, or 
risk of harm, is created with respect to each customer defrauded.  The number of mailings 
would then bear a direct, logical relationship to the harm caused.  If, however, with respect 
to defrauding a customer out of $100 the defendant makes several mailings (the initial 
solicitation, a follow-up solicitation, and a thank you designed to lull the customer into 
inaction), it should be treated as a single scheme to defraud in which there were several 
mailings.  Similarly, a scheme to defraud an insurance company by mailing multiple false 
claims should be treated as a single scheme, not as separate schemes to defraud. 
 178.   See United States v. Davenport, 929 F.2d 1169, 1171 (7th Cir. 1991) (“The 
government’s position [that each deposit equals a separate offense] leads to the weird result 
that if a defendant receives $10,000 and splits it up into 100 deposits he is ten times guiltier 
than a defendant who splits up the same amount into ten deposits.”).   
 179. See, e.g., United States v. Wall, 37 F.3d 1443, 1446 (10th Cir. 1994) (“Each [loan] 
involved a separate movement of money, and each, standing alone, put the bank at risk of 
loss.”).  But see United States v. Heath, 970 F.2d 1397, 1402 (5th Cir. 1992) (“Although a 
two-loan scheme may subject an institution to greater risk than a scheme involving only one 
transaction, it is the execution of the scheme itself that subjects a defendant to criminal 
liability, not, as we stated in Lemons, the execution of each step or transaction in furtherance 
of the scheme.”). 
 180. Compare United States v. Helms, 897 F.2d 1293 (5th Cir. 1990) (charging 
defendant with forty-one mail and wire fraud counts in connection with selling 
distributorship in nonexistent business to 629 victims, defrauding them of more than $5 
million), with United States v. Brown, 948 F.2d 1076 (8th Cir. 1991) (charging defendant 
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Ultimately, the common-sense question is whether the defendant is more 
criminally culpable because of each additional mailing.181 
V. Conclusion 
Over a century ago the Supreme Court held that each separate mailing 
constituted a separate mail fraud offense.  It premised this holding on its 
understanding that abuse of the United States Mail was the “gist” of the 
mail fraud statute.  That premise no longer rings true.  The history of the 
mail fraud statute demonstrates that the government has slowly transformed 
the original mail fraud statute from an act designed to protect the United 
States Post-Office establishment from abuse to a catchall offense for 
attacking any scheme to defraud, with the use of the United States mail or 
commercial mail service acting as a jurisdictional basis only.  It is clear that 
at least since the 1994 amendment to the mail fraud statue, the “gist” of the 
mail fraud statute is the execution of the “scheme or artifice to defraud.”  If 
the foundational premise of the Ex parte Henry holding has since eroded, 
the rule that each mailing constitutes a separate offense sits on shaky 
ground.  To ensure fairness, the time has come for Congress to make clear 
what is apparent.  Each separate mailing made in connection with a scheme 
and artifice to defraud should no longer constitute a separate mail fraud 
offense.   
  
                                                                                                                 
with sixty mail and wire fraud counts in connection with making a fraudulent disability 
claim for monthly benefits of $3511). 
 181. See Rakoff, supra note 15, at 778 (arguing that the number of mail fraud counts 
should be related to such factors as “the scope or duration of the fraud, the number of 
victims, the amount of damage, or any other factor relating to the moral culpability of the 
perpetrator or the social damage inflicted by his fraud,” as opposed to “the sheer 
happenstance of how many times the mails have been used in executing the fraud”). 
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The following is a comparison of the original mail fraud statute and the 
current version of the mail fraud statute. The deletions from the original 
statute are struck out, and the added language is underlined: 
 
That if any person Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any 
scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means 
of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, or to sell, 
dispose of, loan, exchange, alter, give away, distribute, supply, or furnish 
or procure for unlawful use any counterfeit or spurious coin, obligation, 
security, or other article, or anything represented to be or intimate or held 
out to be such counterfeit or spurious article to be effected by either 
opening or intending to open correspondence or communication with any 
other person (whether resident within or outside of the United States), by 
means of the post-office establishment of the United States, or by inciting 
such other person to open communication with the person so devising or 
intending, shall, in and for executing such scheme or artifice (or attempting 
to do so), places any letter or packet in any post-office of the United States 
or authorized depository for mail matter, any matter or thing whatever to 
be delivered by any private or commercial interstate carrier, or takes or 
receives any therefrom, any such matter or thing person, so misusing the 
post-office establishment or knowingly causes to be delivered by mail or 
such carrier according to the direction thereon, or at the place at which it 
is directed to be delivered by the person to whom it is addressed, any such 
matter or thing, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall be punished 
with a fined of not more than five hundred dollars, with or without such 
imprisonment, as the court shall direct, not exceeding eighteen calendar 
months under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty years or both.  
The indictment, information, or complaint may severally charge offenses to 
the number of three when committed within the same six calendar months; 
but the court thereupon shall give a single sentence, and shall proportion the 
punishment especially to the degree in which the abuse of the post-office 
establishment enters as an instrument into such fraudulent scheme or 
devise.  If the violation occurs in relation to, or involving any benefit 
authorized, transported, transmitted, transferred, disbursed, or paid in 
connection with, a presidentially declared major disaster or emergency (as 
those terms are defined in section 102 of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster 
Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. § 5122)), or affects a 
financial institution, such person shall be fined not more than $1,000,000 
or imprisoned not more than 30 years, or both. 
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In other words, the only common statutory language that remains from 
the original statute is: “. . . having devised or intending to devise any 
scheme or artifice to defraud . . . place . . ., or take . . . or receive . . . 
therefrom, . . . such . . ., shall be fine[d] under this title or imprisoned not 
more than twenty years or both.” 
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The below annotated version of the statute readily exposes the alterations 
between original mail fraud statute and the 1909 amended version of the 
mail fraud statute. 
 
That if any person Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any 
scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means 
of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises . . . .to be 
effected by either opening or intending to open correspondence or 
communication with any other person (whether resident within or outside of 
the United States), by means of the post-office establishment of the United 
States, or by inciting such other person to open communication with the 
person so devising or intending, shall for the purpose of, in and for 
executing such scheme or artifice (or attempting to do so), place or caused 
to be placed, any letter or packet, postal card, package, writing, circular, 
pamphlet, or advertisement whether addresses to any person residing 
within or without the United States, 
in any post-office, or station thereof, or street or other letter box of the 
United States, or authorized depository for mail matter, to be sent or 
delivered by the post-office establishment of the United States, or shall take 
or receive any such therefrom, whether mailed within or without the United 
States . ... such person, so misusing the post-office establishment, shall be 
fined not more than one thousand dollars or imprisoned not more than five 
years, or both guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall be punished with a fine of 
not more than five hundred dollars, with or without such imprisonment, as 
the court shall direct, not exceeding eighteen calendar months.  The 
indictment, information, or complaint may severally charge offenses to the 
number of three when committed within the same six calendar months; but 
the court thereupon shall give a single sentence, and shall proportion the 
punishment especially to the degree in which the abuse of the post-office 
establishment enters as an instrument into such fraudulent scheme or 
devise. 
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Amending the language of the mail fraud statute could be accomplished 
by using the language “for the purpose of executing such a scheme” to 
“executes such a scheme,” such that the language matches that of the bank 
fraud statute. There would need to be other minor changes to take into 
account the change in verb tense.  The amendments to the mail fraud statute 
are as follows (with additions underlined and deletions crossed out): 
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to 
defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent 
pretenses, representations, or promises, or to sell, dispose of, loan, 
exchange, alter, give away, distribute, supply, or furnish or procure for 
unlawful use any counterfeit or spurious coin, obligation, security, or other 
article, or anything represented to be or intimated or held out to be such 
counterfeit or spurious article, for the purpose of executing executes such 
scheme or artifice or attemptsing so to do, places by placing in any post 
office or authorized depository for mail matter, any matter or thing 
whatever to be sent or delivered by the Postal Service, or deposits or causes 
by depositing or causing to be deposited any matter or thing whatever to be 
sent or delivered by any private or commercial interstate carrier, or takes or 
receives by taking or receiving therefrom, any such matter or thing, or by 
knowingly causes causing to be delivered by mail or such carrier according 
to the direction thereon, or at the place at which it is directed to be delivered 
by the person to whom it is addressed, any such matter or thing, shall be 
fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both.  If 
the violation occurs in relation to, or involving any benefit authorized, 
transported, transmitted, transferred, disbursed, or paid in connection with, 
a presidentially declared major disaster or emergency (as those terms are 
defined in section 102 of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and 
Emergency Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. § 5122)), or affects a financial 
institution, such person shall be fined not more than $1,000,000 or 
imprisoned not more than 30 years, or both. 
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